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I am from Baltimore, born and raised.
The cultural heros of my hometown are a strange set. They are outsiders and
depressives, lovers of refuse, contemplators of atrocity, and curators of camp. It was
only after leaving that I came to realize how much the city had influenced me.
Foremost among Baltimore’s cultural icons is the poet and critic Edgar Allan
Poe. While he scoffed at didacticism and allegory (a literary device about which
“there is scarcely one respectable word to be said”), Poe is best known today for
works containing strong didactic and allegorical overtones (The Tell-Tale Heart, The
Raven). His penchant for the gothic could verge on the maudlin:
Let the bell toll ! — a saintly soul floats on the Stygian river ;
And, Guy De Vere, hast thou no tear ? — weep now or never more !
See ! on yon drear and rigid bier low lies thy love, Lenore !
We are, nonetheless, proud to claim him as our own. (While Poe was born in
Boston and spent his life in several cities along the eastern seaboard, he did at least
die in Baltimore, after taking the wrong train.) The Baltimore Ravens remain the
only football team named after a poem.
Next there is H.L. Mencken, newspaperman for The Baltimore Sun and sourpuss
extraordinaire. A satirist at heart, Mencken delighted in the well-placed jab (he
dubbed the Scopes case “the Monkey Trial”), and relished the bile directed his way
even more (it takes a special kind of man to publish an anthology containing nothing
but criticism written about you, yet there it is, A Mencken Schimphlexikon). His
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essay The Sahara of the Bozart, which laments the intellectual death of the South, is
one of the finest examples of philippics in the English language.
Then of course there is the filmmaker John Waters: ironic, smirking, smutty.
Waters’ path to legitimacy was paved with épater la bourgeoisie cinematic moments:
a singing asshole, a couple crushing a chicken between their bodies during sex, a
transvestite eating dog shit (and that’s just one movie). In memoirs, he deadpans,
“If someone vomits watching one of my films, it’s like getting a standing ovation.”
The specter of John Waters hung particularly low over our town, perhaps because
he was not dead. In fact, he lived in my neighborhood, and I would sometimes see him
at Eddie’s supermarket, with his pencil mustache, squeezing peaches in the produce
aisle.
One of the members of Waters’ band of Dreamlanders was my art teacher in
elementary school. When I was eight, she tore up a drawing I made of people of all
races holding hands under a rainbow, dismissing it as “too cliché.” I was forbidden
from drawing rainbows in class again. She also did not like the Madonnas I would
paint (I went to an ecclesiastical school). “Honey,” she’d say, taking the brush from
my hand. “It’s been done before.”
By the time I was a teenager I’d graduated to harder stuff. One day a flannel-clad
slacker at the local video store (Video Americain, pronounced “Video Ameri-cahhhn”)
handed me a shopworn copy of Pink Flamingos. “Try it. You’ll like it,” he said.
I came of age in the 1990s, an era of winking, self-deprecating enthusiasm for the
idea that Baltimore was not merely awful, but phenomenally awful, inspirationally
awful. (Previous attempts by city officials to bill it as a place that could compete
by normal standards of excellence were laughed off by its own citizenry; in the late
1980s, a citywide fleet of sky-blue benches with the motto “Baltimore: The City That
Reads” were swiftly defaced: “The City That Breeds” or, for the darker humored,
“The City That Bleeds.”) The American Visionary Arts Museum, a national mecca
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for outsider art, opened in 1995. Popular and critically acclaimed television series
Homicide, The Corner, and The Wire were all based on true crime books from this
decade.
We were taught to love what was terrible about Baltimore, delight in it. Every
Tuesday my father would eat breakfast at Cafe Hon (est. 1992), a restaurant that
embodies, and embraces, John Waters’ vision of the city. An 18-foot lawn flamingo
looms over the door. Inside, the walls are lined with tchotchkes, and waitstaff cultivate
the Tracy Turnblad look. True to form, the food is greasy and indifferent. This is all
part of its charm, of course; Cafe Hon, perhaps more than any other city landmark,
capitalizes on the idea that Baltimore’s central outstanding feature is its kitsch.
From my earliest years, I was steeped in the notion that sometimes things are
so bad they are good again, that the terrible can be a source of genuine, posy-eyed
joy. Camp has market value, as does acid-tongued curmudgeonry (Mencken), and
paranoid, absinthe-laced melancholia (Poe). To think that pleasure only derives from
the straightforwardly nice would mean leaving out a substantial piece of the human
capacity for enjoyment.
I owe Baltimore, and its ragtag team of misfits, a great debt for this insight.
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PREFACE
This dissertation’s frontispiece is an engraving by F. W. Fairholt, based on an
ancient Egyptian painting found at Thebes. It depicts an upper-class woman whose
excesses have gotten the better of her. According to Thomas Wright, the author
of the book where the engraving appears, “the early Egyptian artists cannot always
conceal their natural tendency to the humorous, which creeps out in a variety of little
incidents” (1875, p. 3).
vii
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ABSTRACT
The Hedonics of Disgust
by
Nina Strohminger
Co-Chairs: Richard L. Lewis and Norbert Schwarz
Disgust is a negative emotion, and as such, it is frequently assumed that its only
function is to generate negative evaluations. This dissertation aims to demonstrate
that disgust can generate positive evaluations in the right context.
In Chapter I, we show how the existence of hedonic disgust would be both empiri-
cally novel and counter to predictions made by many current theories of emotion. We
suggest that the impact of disgust depends on context, consistent with feelings-as-
information theory (Schwarz, 2012). To this end, we lay out potential circumstances
under which disgust may be experienced as enjoyable.
In Chapter II, we show that priming disgust with verbal stimuli leads people to rate
both cartoons and moral violations as funnier, and food pictures as less appetizing.
We also find that sad verbal stimuli enhance cartoon ratings, helping to rule out
arousal level as the sole explanation for these effects.
In Chapter III, we show that disgusting verbal stimuli enhance enjoyment of ab-
stract and grotesque art, but not landscape art. We further demonstrate that the
effect of these disgust primes changes depending on the probe, with disgust increas-
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ing both the likability and offensiveness of judged paintings, while leading to lower
ratings of prettiness.
In Chapter IV, we use two additional methods of inducing disgust—a noxious odor,
and a filthy environment—to see whether this would enhance enjoyment of stand-up
comedy and adventurous eating shows. We find that both of these disgust manipu-
lations decrease enjoyment of traditional cooking shows, and increase enjoyment of
adventurous eating shows. The experimental condition had no impact on humor judg-
ments, counter to both feelings-as-information theory and congruency-based emotion
theories.
In Chapter V, we discuss the scope and limitations of the current studies. While
these studies demonstrate that disgust stimuli can have a positive effect on judgments,
this effect is contingent on a variety of factors which are not yet fully understood.
Furthermore, the precise mechanism by which incidental disgust leads to enjoyment
remains unclear. Overall, this work shows that the influence of disgust is highly
context-sensitive, and occasionally favorable, opening up a previously unexplored




1.1 Two related problems
Disgust fuels many of our most negative judgments. The emotion is unleashed by
rotting food and open wounds, traitors and pedophiles. In such cases, disgust sends a
powerful signal to avoid the offending stimulus, a physical if not moral contaminant.
Curiously though, disgust is also present in many enjoyable cultural phenomena.
Dirty jokes, modern art, even gross-out television programming, all seem to derive
some of their power from their ability to disgust us.
This poses a bit of a puzzle for current models of emotion, most of which rely on
the assumption that emotions lead to behavior that is congruent with the original
emotion. How is it that the same stimuli that give rise to negative evaluations can also
delight us in certain contexts? Do we like these experiences because of the negative
feelings they engender, or in spite of them?
In light of these questions, this thesis has two overarching goals. The first is to
revise models of how incidental feelings influence judgment, in order to account for
cases where negative emotions lead to positive evaluations (and vice versa). The
second is to provide a more accurate picture of how a specific emotion, disgust,
operates across different contexts. In the past, these two kinds of question have been
considered independently: trying to cram a ‘grand theory’ of emotional influence
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into one set of rules without looking at the specific instances of how each emotion
functions in context. Taking a more careful look at the specific case of disgust may
help illuminate the mechanisms in place for emotional influence more generally.
1.2 A jargon primer
Before continuing, a crash course in the most important terminology that will be
used here. Sadly, one finds that this vocabulary is anything but scientifically deployed
in the field, so I want to make sure we dispel with any lexical ambiguities from the
start.
1.2.1 Feelings, emotions, and their friends
Broadly speaking, affect is the way an experience feels. Valence, which refers to
pleasantness or unpleasantness, is a type of affect. However, affective experiences are
not limited to valence—sadness feels different than anger, for example.
Following the convention of Thayer (1989), a mood is an affective experience of low
intensity and high temporal extension, compared to an emotion. Emotions typically
involve evaluations in relation to some target—they are ‘about’ something. In this
sense, emotions have an explicit cognitive component, whereas moods are relatively
cognitively bare. This will become relevant when thinking about emotion priming,
as there are affective and cognitive parts of the emotion that may be doing the work
during priming.
Feelings refer to the superset of phenomena that contains moods, emotions, metacog-
nitive experiences, and any other affectively-charged experiences.
1.2.2 Incidental versus integral
We can distinguish between two different ways that feelings influence judgment.
Integral feelings are those which are incited by the stimulus itself. A trashpail of
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maggots elicits disgust, so we avoid it. Incidental feelings linger after the initial
elicitor to affect subsequent behavior. Seeing maggots in the garbage may ruin our
appetite for lunch.
There are two reasons to be interested in incidental feelings. The first is to learn
more about how feelings which have a serendipitous relationship to our decisions
are capable of impinging on them. The second reason is methodological: incidental
feelings can be controlled more easily than integral feelings. Incidental feelings allow
for experimental manipulation. Thus, the fact that our behavior is influenced by
incidental feelings is a useful quirk of human psychology for studying emotions.
The studies proposed here all make use of incidental emotion priming paradigms.
The conclusions we can draw from them, however, can be extended to discussions of
how emotions operate in general.1
1.2.3 Priming versus induction
Priming and induction are both loosely used in the context of psychological meth-
ods that involve systematically changing an affective or mental state. Although the
two words have slightly different connotations (for example, ‘priming’ comes up more
often in subliminal methods as well as non-affective manipulations, such as semantic
priming), the key distinction here is the aspect of the manipulation they emphasize.
Induction refers to the creation of the feeling state itself. Priming refers to the in-
crease in knowledge accessibility, which can lead to a change in behavior (Higgins,
1996). So, a manipulation that induces a state can prime concepts which influence
subsequent behavior.
1It has been suggested that there may be important, systematic ways in which incidental and
integral feelings differ, so we should exercise caution in blindly conflating them (Ellsworth, personal
communication). However, the extent of these differences remains largely untested‘, so for the
purposes of this research, we will treat them as comparable.
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1.2.4 Congruent versus diagonal
Although discussed in greater detail below, congruent effects are those which
exhibit a matching between the feeling and the behavior. Typically, this matching is
at the level of valence, with positive feelings begetting positive behavior, and negative
begetting negative. However, congruity theories exist in more complex variants, where
the entire pattern of the emotion maps onto the behavior (angry people are more
aggressive). This mapping can operate quite metaphorically—people treat social acts
as if they were contaminants when they have been physically disgusted (Schnall,
Haidt, Clore, & Jordan, 2008) and act morally superior when they feel physically
clean (Zhong, Strejcek, & Sivanathan, 2010).
Nesse (2004) uses the term ‘diagonal psychology’ to refer to the study of the
positive effects of negative states and vice versa. We borrow from this locution here to
define diagonal effects as those which show an opposite relationship between feelings
and behavior. For our purposes, diagonal effects and emotion-judgment incongruity
can be considered interchangeable.
1.3 How do feelings influence judgment?
1.3.1 Major models
Numerous models for how feelings influence behavior have been proposed. Most,
however, rely on some form of congruity theory : that is, they assume that the nature
of the original emotion will cause some analogue in the subsequent behavior. Valence
congruity plays a prominent role in most theories of mood (and some theories of
emotion). Appraisal-based accounts of emotion don’t rely solely on valence, but
do posit appraisal congruency. The existence of diagonal effects poses a potential
problem for both sets of models.
One popular explanation for how feelings influence cognition are memory-based
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models. Loosely speaking, these models work by semantic network activation: neg-
ative feelings make other negative ideas easier to access, and downstream cognitive
processes incorporate these activated ideas (Bower, 1981; Isen, 1984). Such accounts
have been used to predict mood and emotion congruency effects.
Then there are models that do not rely on semantic priming, but self-reflection.
This is feelings-as-information theory (FAIT), which exists in several permutations
sharing the common supposition that people treat their feelings as a source of guidance
about the world (Schwarz & Clore, 1988). Someone who is unhappy and then goes
shopping may mistakenly think her negative reaction to a dress is because she dislikes
it, rather than her preexisting rotten mood. FAIT has an edge over semantic priming
models because it can account for certain blips in affective influence, including that
mood has negligible influence when objective facts are all that is needed to render a
judgment (Schwarz, Strack, Kommer, & Wagner, 1987) and when people suspect the
mood may be biasing them (Schwarz & Clore, 1983).
Nonetheless, early versions of Schwarz and Clore’s theory implicated congruency
so long as the feeling was actually being used (Schwarz & Bohner, 1996). Similarly,
(Clore, 1992) argued that the process was additive: evaluating negative stimuli while
in a negative mood will lead to an especially negative judgment. Such views leave
very little room for diagonal effects.
Theories of emotion further demonstrate the pervasive assumption of congruity.
These theories depart from the valence-based accounts in that they posit emotional
impacts that are as varied as the emotions themselves. (Because they focus on ex-
plaining the variety of emotional influence rather than the cognitive mechanism of
that influence, they need not be viewed as an alternative to semantic activation mod-
els or FAIT.)
Categorical theories describe emotion in terms of discrete, ‘basic’ emotions that
are relatively inflexible and independent of one another (Ekman, 1992; Izard, 1977).
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Categorical theories can be contrasted with appraisal theories, which instead charac-
terize emotions in terms of how they rank along several dimensions, including cer-
tainty, agency, importance, and valence (Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003). The key insight
of appraisal theories is that emotions result from a (potentially labile) assessment
of one’s own circumstances. The emotion elicited depends in part on the resultant
action tendencies: disgust is no longer ‘real’ disgust if it doesn’t lead to avoidance or
negative evaluations.
Just as appraisals suggest emotions, emotions suggest appraisals. This symmetry
has been used to demonstrate which appraisals go into emotions, based on the biases
that linger afterwards—an example of the power of incidental emotions. Recent years
have witnessed a crop of work on these so-called ‘appraisal tendencies’, showing that
the influence of an emotion goes beyond mere valence and reflects the function of
individual emotions (Keltner, Ellsworth, & Edwards, 1993; Lerner & Keltner, 2000).
The appraisal tendency framework (ATF) suggests a one-to-one mapping between
emotion and appraisal, with each emotion afforded a single, unique appraisal. For
example, the appraisal of anger is that a negative event caused by someone else has
taken place, so an angry decision-maker will tend to act in accordance with this
appraisal (Lerner & Tiedens, 2006).
The strict relationship between appraisal and emotion proposed in these theo-
ries means that they are not yet able to accommodate the existence of diagonal ef-
fects. In this respect, emotion-based theories are even less flexible than valence-based
theories—instead of a vague positive or negative, emotions entail a more elaborate,
and constrained, assessment of a situation.
1.3.2 Explaining diagonal effects
Diagonal, or at least incongruent, effects have been observed in the literature for
many years. Typically this has been explained one of two ways: either the prime
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was ignored (as in Schwarz & Clore, 1983), or it was used as a source of contrast in
the subsequent judgment. Contrast effects may emerge when the prime becomes the
measure against which the target judgment is made, particularly if the pre-existing
mood and the prime are sufficiently disparate (Mark, Sinclair, & Wellens, 1991). Since
incongruity effects are more common for negative moods, it has also been proposed
they are a form of mood regulation—if you make someone feel bad enough, they will
recall more pleasant memories in order to return to a positive mood (Blaney, 1986;
Parrott & Sabini, 1990). Such accounts seek to explain incongruity with a mechanism
added over top the original model, rather than adjusting the model itself.
Recently, however, a new crop of research has pushed on these explanations as not
capable of explaining all the observed phenomena. L. Martin, Abend, Sedikides, and
Green (1997) hypothesized that people attend to whether the emotion is relevant to
achieving a particular goal (“role fulfillment”). To test this idea, they put subjects
in either a happy or a sad mood, had them read happy or sad stories, then had them
rate the stories for how much they liked them. Under traditional memory-based and
FAIT accounts, subjects should have liked both happy and sad stories better when
in a good mood. Under the ‘additivity’ hypothesis of Clore and others, reading a
sad story in a sad mood should have made subjects like the story least of any of
the four conditions. Under the mood repair hypothesis, subjects should have liked
the happy and sad stories the same when they were in a sad mood. And, if there
had been a contrast effect, subjects should have liked the happy (sad) stories the
most when they were in a sad (happy) mood. Instead, Martin and colleagues found
that subjects preferred sad stories when in a sad mood, and happy stories when in
a happy mood. They explain these findings by saying that subjects recognize that,
when reading sad stories, they ought to feel sad, and to the extent that they feel sad
while reading the stories, they judge the sad story to be a good, effective example of
a tearjerker. While there may be context-insensitive information in moods (such as
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negative mood = unsafe), there are no context-insensitive evaluations (the sense of
risk on a rollercoaster can easily translate to a positive, thrilling experience; see also
Mesquita, 2010).2
Although both memory-based models and FAIT have been used to explain congru-
ency effects, if you look carefully, congruity itself is not actually part of the proposed
mechanism. Rather, it is an additional, inessential assumption that could easily be
jettisoned. Recall that memory-based models work by semantic network activation.
A person who has been disgusted could have a diverse set of information primed—not
just contamination, disease, and mortality, but also weirdness, interestingness, and
funniness. The model itself is silent about what those ‘related’ items in the semantic
network actually are.
FAIT contains a similar agnosticism, a fact which Schwarz and colleagues have
developed in recent iterations of the theory. Kim, Park, and Schwarz (2009) found
that discrete positive emotions (serene or excited) have opposite effects on evaluation
depending on product expectations (a vacation to Japan touted as either relaxing
or adventurous), a finding consistent with L. Martin et al. (1997) role-fulfillment hy-
pothesis. Feelings-as-information can also accommodate this finding—people judge
the goodness of a product by consulting with how it makes them feel, and matching
this feeling to how the product is supposed to make them feel. Thus, positive emo-
tions do not necessarily make for more positive evaluations. (L. Martin et al. (1997)’s
view is so compatible with FAIT that it has since been adopted as an example that
illustrates, rather than contradicts, the theory (Schwarz, 2012).) However, Kim et al.
(2009) insist: “We hasten to add that positive effects of matching feelings are likely
to be limited to positive emotions. In the unlikely case that a product makes negative
2Appraisal theories have made a related point by putting valence and goals on different dimen-
sions, suggesting that things that feel bad can also motivate us. However, appraisal theories usually
make the bolder claim that if the behavior or evaluation is different in the two different contexts,
the emotion is also different. It seems bizarre in this case to say that people are not ‘really’ sad
when reading a sad story, just because they appreciate the experience.
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emotional claims, experiencing these emotions should result in a high perceived like-
lihood that the product delivers what it promises—yet this perception will rarely be
associated with a desire to consume it” (p. 989). Although the authors are resistant
to the idea that consumers (or anyone) could want to feel bad, they do grudgingly
admit that, under such circumstances, feeling bad should make them appreciate the
product more.
Part of what is missing from these accounts is any heed to the specific emotions
and contexts involved. The models have tried to apply a theory that is naive of
content and insensitive to specifics. So, while the suggested mechanisms do not rule
out incongruity, they are unable to make specific predictions about what we will find
across emotions, judgments, and contexts. The models are too underdetermined to
predict the variety of effects we really see. To do this, we need to look lower, at the
level of the particular emotions and situations in question. The rules for how feelings
influence judgment—and, importantly, insight as to why!—are going to turn on the
specifics.
1.4 What is the appraisal process of disgust?
Disgust is a surprisingly understudied emotion. Although recognized as one of
the basic emotions, it is consistently left out of descriptions of different emotional
appraisals (see, for instance, Lerner & Keltner, 2000, p.479; Ellsworth & Scherer,
2003, p. 583; Levine & Pizarro, 2004; cf. Frijda, 1986, p. 88 and Lazarus, 1991,
p. 131 ). Lazarus (1991, p. 131) describes disgust’s appraisal as “taking in or being
too close to an indigestible object or an idea (metaphorically speaking).” Similarly,
Frijda (1986)’s ‘action tendency’3 for disgust is portrayed as rejecting and removing
3Lerner and Keltner’s ‘appraisal tendencies’ are intended to be a contrastive reference to Frijda’s
‘action tendencies’, where behavior: judgment :: action tendency : appraisal tendency. Frijda’s
‘action tendencies’ are themselves a reference to (Lorenz & Kickert, 1981)’s ‘fixed action patterns’,
where tendency is meant to highlight the flexibility of human emotions relative to animal reflexes.
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the offending stimulus.
The number of studies that attempt to experimentally demonstrate this as ap-
praisal for disgust are few in number and, somewhat lopsidedly, limited to the re-
lationship between disgust and moral judgment (Horberg, Oveis, Keltner, & Cohen,
2009; Schnall, Haidt, et al., 2008; Wheatley & Haidt, 2005). To this author’s knowl-
edge, no one has published data showing that incidental disgust makes food less
appealing, perhaps because this was considered too obvious to bother with (manip-
ulation checks in the work presented here may be the first such demonstration). An
unpublished paper has shown that this appraisal also applies to consumer decisions,
with disgusted subjects more likely to devalue products and throw them away (Han,
Lerner, & Zeckhauser, 2008).
Before now, there has been a fair amount of agreement about the appraisal of dis-
gust, and the influence we should expect it to have. The existence of diagonal effects
in disgust would pose a major problem for these accounts, and would require one of
two revisions. One is that different emotions are being experienced in congruent and
incongruent cases, such that a person enjoying a ribald punchline is not experienc-
ing disgust. Because people self-report feeling disgust (and amusement) when they
encounter dirty humor (McGraw & Warren, 2010), this may not be the best explana-
tion. The other solution is that the same emotional experience can lead to different
evaluations depending on context, and that multiple appraisal tendencies need to be
proposed for different emotions. The extant appraisal framework is flexible enough to
accommodate such a revision, but the specific circumstances in which we can expect
this pattern to emerge have not been adequately mapped out, either theoretically or
empirically. In looking at the different appraisal tendencies inherent to disgust we
also hope to illuminate how flexible appraisal tendencies are across contexts.
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1.5 Benign masochism
We may wonder why or how an appraisal for disgust could change so radically
depending on context. After all, the function of this emotion is to keep us away from
vectors of disease and other forms of contamination (Rozin, Haidt, & McCauley,
1993). Given the extreme aversiveness of disgust, it is a bit puzzling that it should
ever be sought out, or a source of pleasure.
This problem is not unique to disgust, but crops up in a multitude of other negative
experiences: roller coasters, sad novels, horror movies, spicy foods, and certain sexual
fetishes. The phenomenon has been collectively referred to as benign masochism
(Rozin, 1990). The crucial observation about these instances is that they are not
pursued despite their unpleasantness, but because of it (unlike, say, going on a run
or writing a paper, which serves a superordinate goal). For instance, it has been
demonstrated that the burning sensation caused by spicy foods (rather than other
factors, like flavor) underlies their appeal, because when their piquancy is removed,
they are not liked as much (Rozin & Schiller, 1980).
One account of benign masochism holds that watching or participating in such
acts may draw us in because they allow a safe space in which we can gain mastery
over our emotions and environment (Bloom, 2010). We may be too faint-hearted
to eat crickets ourselves, but watching others conquer their feelings may help us do
the same, should the situation one day warrant it. There are a few problems with
this theory. It’s hard to imagine that laughing when someone steps in dog poop is a
strategy for conquering our feelings. Also, the implication that emotions are there to
be conquered and regulated runs counter to the idea that emotions are a functional
part of human psychology: watching movies of people being chased by bears so we
learn to be indifferent during a bear attack seems like a rather bad idea. (Nor has
a causal link for participating in benign masochistic activities and ability to regulate
mood been shown.)
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One thing these instances do all seem to have in common is they do not engender
any real or serious danger (hence ‘benign’). It is possible that any negative feeling has
the potential to be enjoyable when it is stripped of the belief that what is happening
is actually bad, leaving behind physiological arousal that is, in itself, exhilarating or
interesting. Whatever the reason, the cases explored here, including dirty humor and
nontraditional art, are all cases where no harm can actually befall the participant,
such that the emotion being experienced is detached from any real danger.
The notion that disgust could have positive hedonic impact is not new (Rozin,
1990; Korsmeyer, 2011), but the possibility that disgust fuels liking in such instances
has not yet been experimentally demonstrated.
In this thesis, we attempt such a demonstration. In Chapter II, we investigate
how low arousal emotions, including disgust, influence judgments of funniness. In
Chapter III, we investigate the ways in which incidental feelings of disgust alter our
assessments of different forms of art. In Chapter IV, we look at how olfactory and
environmental cues of disgust impact enjoyment of comedy routines and adventurous
eating shows. Finally, in Chapter V we provide a summary and analysis of the
empirical work presented here.
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CHAPTER II
The Effect of Disgust and Sadness on Humor
Although humor is frequently regarded as a benevolent force and is highly sought
after as a source of entertainment, the actual content of humor can be quite nega-
tive (Cousins, 1979; McGhee, 2010; c.f. Billig, 2005). A central debate of the field
is whether the dark, dirty, and offensive elements found in humor contribute to our
enjoyment of it (R. Martin, 2007). Early psychoanalytic theories argued for a crucial
connection between humor and the taboo (Freud, 1905/1963), while subsequent cog-
nitive theories have downplayed or even dismissed this relationship (Koestler, 1964;
Raskin, 1985; Attardo, 1994). However, the exact role that negative emotional expe-
riences play in generating amusement remains unclear, and largely untested.
Given that so many theories of humor have centered around stress and arousal dy-
namics (Spencer, 1860; Freud, 1905/1963; Berlyne, 1972; Hurley, Dennett, & Adams,
2011), many researchers have posited that physiological arousal is behind the appeal
of negative experiences in humorous utterances. Certainly it is the case that psy-
chophysiological arousal increases as a result of exposure to humorous stimuli: cor-
tisol and epinephrine increase immediately after watching comedy films (Levi, 1965;
Hubert, Möller, & Jong-Meyer, 1993), and when heart rate and skin conductance are
measured during the set-up and punchline of jokes, arousal increases for the entirety
of the joke, with their peak immediately following the punchline (Godkewitsch, 1976).
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What happens when arousal is independently manipulated before presenting sub-
jects with humorous material? In one experiment, students were instructed to either
handle a docile rat (low anxiety condition), extract a blood sample (moderate anx-
iety condition), or extract a large amount of blood from a rat described as prone
to biting and escaping (high anxiety condition). When the cage opened and the rat
was revealed to be a toy, subjects thought this was funniest in the anxiety-provoking
conditions (Shurcliff, 1968). While there was no difference in amusement between
the high and moderate anxiety conditions, amusement was correlated with subjective
reports of anxiety and surprise.
Consistent with the idea that joking serves as an outlet for inappropriate sexual
and aggressive impulses, manipulations of anger (by way of a rude experimenter)
lead to higher judged funniness of jokes, and the presence of humor subsequently
attenuates anger levels (Strickland, 1959; Dworkin & Efran, 1967). Sexual arousal
also increases funniness ratings (Cantor et al., 1974; Strickland, 1959; Lamb, 1968;
Davis & Farina, 1970). Although sexual arousal has a positive hedonic tone, it is still
taboo (perhaps especially in a laboratory setting), so in this sense may contain some
of the nervous or tendentious elements contained in more overtly unpleasant material.
A limitation of the existing literature is that arousal and affective valence are
confounded: the manipulation always has a stronger affective valence and arousal
level than the control condition. This makes it difficult to tease apart what is driving
the effect. For example, in Cantor et al. (1974), subjects read either a low arousal
negative passage (about the adverse effects of snowmobiles on ecology), a high arousal
negative passage (a graphic description of a lynch mob torturing an innocent boy),
a low arousal positive passage (about the benefits of the recent surge in the beaver
population on the local ecology), or a high arousal positive passage (a bowdlerization-
worthy sexual liaison containing phrases such as “bursting plum-colored nipples”).
Subjects then rated a series of jokes and cartoons. The authors found that the
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unequal cell frequencies, the method of un-
weighted means, were used in the data analy-
ses.
Assessment of the Effectiveness of the
Manipulations
In order to determine whether the chosen
excerpts produced the desired differentiations,
analyses of variance were performed on the
ratings of how arousing and how pleasant the
subjects found the material. The ratings of
arousingness, used to assess the excitatory
potential of the stimuli, yielded the required
differentiations. In these ratings, the main
effect of excitatory potential was highly sig-
nificant (F = 18.812, df = 1/112, p < .001).
The mean of the arousingness ratings was
43.897 under low excitation and 67.333 under
high excitation. Table 1 shows that the means
corresponding to the excitatory effect were
ideally differentiated both under conditions of
positive and negative hedonic tone. While no
other effects in the analysis reached signifi-
cance, the main effect of sex of subject and
the interaction between sex of subject and
hedonic tone approached significance (F =
2.879 and F = 3.207, respectively, dj = I/
112, p < .10). Both effects were due to the
tendency, in the conditions of negative he-
donic tone, of females to rate themselves as
more aroused than males. Because of the
failure of these effects to attain significance
and because the ratio of males to females in
all conditions was approximately equal, these
effects are not considered to detract from the
achieved satisfactory differentiation in excita-
tory potential.
The ratings of pleasantness, used to assess
the hedonic tone of the passages, yielded the
desired highly significant main effect of
hedonic tone (F = 20S.839, df = 1/112, p <
.001). The mean of the pleasantness ratings
in the conditions of negative hedonic tone
was -42.614; in the positive-hedonic condi-
tions it was SI.209. The analysis of these
ratings produced other highly significant ef-
fects as well. The low-excitation passages
were rated significantly more pleasant than
the high-excitation passages (low excitation,
X= 16.998, high excitation, ^=-8.403;
F= 15.086, d f = 1/112, / > < .001). Males,
MEAN RATINGS OP AROUSINGNESS AND PLEASANTNESS
or THE FOUR WRITTEN EXCERPTS EFFECTING THE





















Note. Means having different letter subscripts differ signi-
ficantly at p < .05 by Neman-Keuls's test.
considered the stimuli significantly more
pleasant than females did (males, X =
14.755, females, X =-6.160; ^=10.228,
df = 1/112, p < .005). Finally, there was a
significant interaction between hedonic tone
and excitatory potential (F = 61.733, df =
1/112, p < .001). As can be seen from Table
1, this interaction was due to the fact that
the highly arousing excerpts were more polar-
ized along the pleasantness continuum than
the minimally arousing ones. Whereas this
interaction pattern was not sought in terms
of the experimental variations required, it
seems that it might have been expected on
intuitive grounds. A highly arousing passage
which is not at the same time either ex-
tremely pleasant or extremely unpleasant, or
a highly pleasant or unpleasant passage
which is not at the same time highly arousing
seems difficult to find or create. At any rate,
because the excerpts in both conditions of
positive hedonic tone received mean ratings
on the positive side of the pleasantness con-
tinuum and were rated significantly more
pleasant than the passages in both conditions
of negative hedonic tone, which were both on
the negative side of the continuum, the manip-
ulation of hedonic tone is considered adequate.
In addition, since variations in hedonic tone
cannot account for the overall effects in the
humor appreciation data to be reported, this
unexpected interaction is not considered det-
rimental to the goals of the investigation.
There was no indication whatsoever that
subjects failed to take the highly arousing
passages seriously or possibly considered them
as put-ons or jokes in themselves. The ma-
Figure 2.1: Ratings of the passages in Cantor et al. (1974), showing that the high
rousal pa sages were also more extreme in hedonic impact.
high arousal passages elicited higher funniness ratings than either of the low arousal
passages. The problem here is that the higher arousal passages are also more intensely
positive and negative (as confirmed by their own manipulation check; see Figure 2.1).
Emotional intensity is considered an independent dimension from arousal by most
modern emotion researchers (Bradley & Lang, 1994; Fontaine, Scherer, Roesch, &
Ellsworth, 2007).
As it turns out, the only direct manipulation of physiological arousal on record con-
tradicts the view that arousal plays any role in altering humor judgments. Schachter
and Wheeler (1962) administered a syringe of epinephrine (sympathetic nervous sys-
tem agonist), chlorpromazine (sympathetic nervous system antagonist), or a saline
placebo (control condition). People who’d e eived epinephrine were more likely to
actively join in with a stooge’s clowning around while waiting in a room, and less likely
to do so if they’d received chlorpromazine, compared to the control condition. How-
ever, the injections m de no difference for self-report of m o , or how funny subjects
found the stooge’s shenanigans. The fact that subjective mirth did not change when
physiological arousal was directly manipulated suggests that physiological arousal
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alone is not sufficient to alter humor perception.
Another problem with this view is that low arousal negative emotions feature
prominently in humor. Dirty jokes, for example, elicit a combination of amusement
and disgust (Hemenover & Schimmack, 2007), and disgusting stimuli can elicit spon-
taneous laughter (Rozin, Haidt, & McCauley, 2010). Likewise, dark and gallows
humor appear to trade on emotions such as sadness. Sadness and disgust are consis-
tently self-reported as low arousal, both when compared to other emotions and when
compared to neutral states (Russell & Bullock, 1985; Stark, Walter, Schienle, & Vaitl,
2005; Fontaine et al., 2007). Psychophysiological measures tell a comparable story:
disgust lowers heart rate (Hare, 1972; Ekman, Levenson, & Friesen, 1983; Levenson,
Ekman, & Friesen, 1990; Levenson, 1992), sadness and disgust lower skin temperature
(Ekman et al., 1983; Stark et al., 2005), and sadness reduces muscle activity, as mea-
sured by forearm flexor muscle tension (Levenson et al., 1990). Sadness and disgust
increase gastric activity, as measured by salivation and eletrogastogram, suggesting
that these emotions are more closely tied to resting-state parasympathetic response
(Levenson, 1992; Vianna & Tranel, 2006; Mendes, 2009). In spite of the presence
of low-arousal negative emotional content in humor, there have been no empirical
investigations of how these emotions might impact amusement.
The possibility that unpleasant feeling underlies some of the comedic impact of
humor is especially intriguing in light of our current understanding of negative emo-
tions. Disgust is thought to have originated as a mechanism to keep us away from
pathogens and other contaminants (Darwin, 1872/2002; Rozin, Haidt, & McCauley,
1999; Curtis, De Barra, & Aunger, 2011). Thus, its primary effect on behavior ought
to be recoil and rejection (Angyal, 1941; Miller, 1997), and negative valence in gen-
eral is thought to function as a defensive, withdrawal mechanism (Lang, Bradley, &
Cuthbert, 1992). Disgust fosters a mood-congruent response across several domains:
it leads us to morally condemn actions (Schnall, Haidt, et al., 2008; Chapman, Kim,
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Susskind, & Anderson, 2009), eschew incest (Schaich Borg, Lieberman, & Kiehl,
2008), and throw products away (Han et al., 2008). Sadness, an emotion related to
loss and rejection, also creates mood-congruent responses, with unhappy memories
in one domain (like romantic failure) triggering judgments of failure across multiple
domains (Kavanagh & Bower, 1985).
While empirical work has been unanimous in finding that disgust elicits negative
evaluations, some scholars have observed that disgust also has a paradoxical allure
(Miller, 1997; Rozin et al., 1999; Korsmeyer, 2011). We are drawn to car crashes,
sideshow exhibits, and game shows where contestants eat bugs. There is also limited
evidence that sadness can enhance enjoyment under the proper circumstances: when
in a sad mood, people enjoy sad stories more than when they have been put into a
happy mood (and vice versa; L. Martin et al., 1997).
The question of whether negative emotions contribute to the enjoyment of hu-
mor speaks to the larger question of how emotional dimensions influence downstream
processes. Most contemporary theories predict congruent effects between emotion
and cognition. Mood-based theories hold that emotions increase the accessibility of
emotion-congruent information (Bower, 1981; Isen, 1984); these theories would pre-
dict that disgust and sadness should bring negative information to mind, resulting
in negative evaluations. Emotion-specific theories posit that emotions engender re-
sponses corresponding to the core theme or appraisal dimensions of that emotion
(Lazarus, 1991; Lerner & Keltner, 2000); these theories would predict that disgust
and sadness should elicit judgments consistent with rejection, aversion, and loss.
The alternative possibility, that negative emotions could engender a positive or
hedonic response for certain judgments, has a precedent in feelings-as-information
theory, which holds that emotions only have an influence on judgments to the extent
that they are considered relevant or apt to the task at hand (Schwarz & Clore, 1983;
Schwarz, 2012). So, if discomfort or emotional intensity are considered signals of a
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successful joke, then they may feed into judgments that the joke was a funny one.
While this theory does not make specific predictions about how negative emotions
will impact enjoyment of humor, it does allow for the possibility that sadness and
disgust could be flexible enough in their impact to create positive responses, given
the proper setting.
The goals of the present set of studies are, therefore, threefold. The first is to
establish whether the effects previously established for high arousal negative emotions
on humor are limited to those with high arousal, or whether they extend to low arousal
negative emotions as well. The second goal is to demonstrate that there are contexts
where disgust and sadness could engender a positive response. This would be the
first such instance of hedonic disgust reported in the literature, and among the first
reported for sadness (the L. Martin et al. (1997) paper cited above is the only other
example we are aware of). Finally, we would like to test the scope of disgust’s impact
on judgments of funniness, to see if it only applies when judging humorous stimuli,
or if it extends to assessments of moral violations. These results would contribute
significant new knowledge both to models of humor and to models of emotion.
To test these possibilities, we induced incidental disgust and sadness before asking
participants to evaluate the appetizingness of food, the funniness of cartoons (Study
1), and the funniness of moral violations (Study 2).
2.1 Study 1: Cartoons
2.1.1 Cartoon Selection
The cartoons used in this study come from a corpus of 600 selected from The
New Yorker. 300 of the cartoons were published in the magazine between 1994–2004
(Mankoff, Remnick, & Gopnik, 2004). The other 300 were submitted to The New
Yorker during this period but were rejected because they were deemed too risqué
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(Diffee & Mankoff, 2006; Diffee, 2007). The rejected and published cartoons took
the same single-panel form and were by the same set of artists. Figure 2.2 gives a
sampling of these cartoons.
To determine the stimulus properties of this corpus, undergraduates at the Uni-
versity of Michigan rated cartoons for funniness and dirtiness (scale 1–6; or 0 for “I
don’t get it”), spread across two one-hour sessions (N = 82). Although the principal
reason for conducting this norming study was to gather descriptive information about
the humor corpus, it bears noting that the dirtier a cartoon was rated, the funnier
it was considered, r(598) = .10, p < .02, this in spite of the fact that the cleaner
cartoons were the ones selected for publication.
The cartoons to be used in the priming experiment were determined by applying
an automated selective-search algorithm written in the R statistical package. This
algorithm was designed to select a subset of cartoons (120) that would maximize
dirtiness for 60 of the cartoons, minimize dirtiness for the other 60, while keeping
overall funniness as equal across the two groups as possible. The selected cartoons
had a dirtiness mean of 3.1 (SD = .39) for dirty cartoons and 1.0 (SD = .01) for
clean cartoons. Dirty cartoons had a mean funniness rating of 2.6 (SD = .40), and
clean cartoons 2.3 (SD = .48). Although mean ratings of funniness hover around the
scale’s midpoint, any rating above 1 should be interpreted as at least some quantity
of amusement.1
2.1.2 Manipulation Check of Emotion Primes Using Self-Report
The emotion primes were four-word sentences designed to be either physically
disgusting (“The sewage was green”), sad (“His faithful dog died”), or neutral/no
1It is hard to get terribly high overall cartoon ratings for at least two reasons. One, there is
a large amount of disagreement in what is funny—even the best of jokes will leave some people
offended, rolling their eyes, or scratching their heads. Perhaps more importantly, humor occurs
more frequently and with more intensity when in a social context (Provine & Fischer, 1989), so
mid-scale ratings may be near the upper bound of amusement we can expect from people reading
cartoons alone in a study setting.
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A cartoon by Jack Ziegler (Clean) A cartoon by Pat Byrnes (Clean)
A cartoon by J.C. Duffy (Dirty) A cartoon by David Sipress (Dirty)
Figure 2.2: Sample cartoons used in the priming experiment.
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emotion (“The pillows are cotton”; see Appendix A for the full list). 240 such sen-
tences were prepared, 80 in each emotion category.
In an online study, 62 subjects (Mdnage = 30.5, 56% female) were given the 240
sentences and asked to choose the emotion that the sentence “predominantly evokes”
in them. They could choose from four options: “Disgust”, “Sadness”, “No emotion”,
or “Other emotion” (for the last option, subjects were asked to specify what emotion
the sentence made them feel). Participants could choose only one of the options.
Order of sentences was randomized between subjects. The survey took approximately
20 minutes, after which subjects were paid.
An overview of the results of the study are presented in Table 2.1. Sentences in
the nominal disgust condition were categorized as disgusting 64% of the time.2 By
contrast, the neutral and sad sentences were put into the disgust category less than
2% of the time. Sentences in the sadness condition were categorized as sad 73% of
the time (compared to 4% and 3% for the disgusting and neutral sentences), and
sentences in the neutral condition were categorized as evoking no emotion 89% of the
time.
As evidenced by Table 2.1, sentences that failed to evoke the intended emotion
(sadness or disgust) were more likely to be categorized as emotionally neutral than
some other emotion. Given that neutral is our control condition, this suggests that
differences that emerge between the experimental and control conditions will be in
spite of the affective similarity between some of the negative emotion stimuli and the
neutral stimuli.
The text entry responses give us no reason to think that any of the individual
sentences reliably elicited a dramatically different emotion than the intended one.
2This figure collapses across individual sentences within category, which ranged in how reliably
they were put into the intended category. Since this study was run as confirmation of the validity of
these stimuli only after the priming studies were performed, there was no opportunity to kick out
the lowest-scoring items. When one subsets out the least disgusting disgust and least sad sadness
sentences, the results reported in §2.1.5 are not reliably different.
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Table 2.1: The frequency that items in the three emotion conditions of the scram-
bled sentence corpus were reported as eliciting one of four different emotional states.
Figures in bold face indicate the most frequently selected choice for each emotion
condition.
Nominal condition
% self-reporting Disgust Sadness Neutral
“Disgust” 64.1% 1.5% 1.8%
“Sadness” 4.3% 72.9% 2.9%
“No emotion” 31.0% 24.2% 89.1%
“Other emotion” 0.6% 1.4% 6.2%
In fact, the typed-in responses often referenced conceptually similar states to the
intended category. For example, disgust sentences were sometimes labeled “aversion”,
neutral sentences could convey “boredom” or “calm”, and sadness sentences were
sometimes classified as “depression”, “desperation”, “sorrow”, or “despair”. Our
participants’ sensitivity to these nuances likely reflects the fact that emotional states
do not conform to sharp natural categories (Demiralp et al., in press). Thus, the
figures in Table 2.1 may underestimate the aptness of the sentences to elicit the
intended emotion.
At the same time, the fact that we did not provide a more representative listing
of emotions for subjects to choose from may be artificially inflating how well the
sentences fit into the sadness and disgust categories. Even though we gave an option
for “Other”, the emotions mentioned by name will be the most salient, which could
bias subjects towards selecting them. Nonetheless, the sentences within a putative
emotion category elicit the intended emotion more often than do the sentences from
the other categories: the disgusting sentences elicit disgust more reliably than the
non-disgust sentences, the sad primes elicit sadness more reliably than the non-sad
sentences, and the neutral primes elicit little to no emotion more reliably than the
non-neutral sentences. Thus, these sentences as a whole have content validity for
their target emotion.
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Figure 2.3: Sample food images from the implicit manipulation check study in § 2.1.3
2.1.3 Manipulation Check of Emotion Primes Using An Implicit Measure
A second manipulation check on these stimuli complements the self-report data.
130 participants were given scrambled versions of the disgust or neutral sentences to
put into grammatical order (the sentence unscrambling task; Srull & Wyer, 1979).
After unscrambling each sentence, they were given a food photograph to rate for
how appetizing it looked on a 6-point scale (1 = “Not at all appetizing”; 6 = “Very
appetizing”). Sample food images are reproduced in Figure 2.3. Sad sentences were
not tested. For further details on the design of this study, see Section 3.1.
Confirming that our manipulation was successful, the food items were rated as
less appetizing after exposure to disgusting (M = 3.21) compared to neutral (M =
3.94) sentences; paired t(128) = 14.3, p < .0001, d = .45 (Figure 2.4). This is the first
experimental demonstration that incidental disgust makes food seem less appetizing,
a finding that is consistent with the postulate that a primary function of disgust is
to aid in the oral rejection of spoiled or contaminated food (Rozin & Fallon, 1987;

















Figure 2.4: Results from the manipulation check priming experiment in § 2.1.3. Inci-
dental disgust led to lower ratings of appetizingness of food. Whiskers represent the
standard error.
2.1.4 Experiment Methods
279 American, native English speakers (61% male; age 18–81, Mdnage = 29) were
told they were participating in a study on multitasking. They completed the 50-
minute paid study online.
In a 3 (disgust vs. sadness vs. neutral control primes) x 2 (clean vs. dirty jokes)
factorial between-subjects design, participants were exposed to emotion prime sen-
tences before rating the funniness of either clean or dirty cartoons. Humor stimuli
were 60 dirty or clean cartoons, as selected on the basis of the norming study in
Section 2.1.1. Emotion stimuli were 60 disgusting, sad, or emotionally neutral sen-
tences randomly selected between subjects from a pool of 80 possible within-emotion
condition sentences, as described in § 2.1.2 (and listed in Appendix A).
Each cartoon was preceded by a single scrambled sentence. After typing the
sentence in grammatically correct form, participants read a cartoon on a new screen,
rated its funniness (1 = “Not at all funny”; 5 = “Very funny”), and advanced to a
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screen containing the next scrambled sentence. There were 60 trials. Cartoon and
sentence order were independently randomized between subjects.
2.1.5 Results
Cartoons were rated as funnier in the disgust (M = 3.3) than in the control (M
= 2.8) condition; F (1,276) = 26.2, p < .0001, Cohen’s d = .33, for the main effect of
emotion induction in a two-way repeated measures ANOVA. This main effect was not
qualified by an interaction with cartoon type; F (1,275) = 1.15, p = .28 (Figure 2.5).
Cartoons in the sadness condition were rated as funnier than those in the neutral
control condition (M sad = 3.41, M neutral = 2.80, t = 27.9, p < .0001; d = .41). For
the dirty cartoons only, the sadness primes were more effective at enhancing funniness
than the disgust primes (M sad = 3.58, M disgust = 3.32, t = 8.0, p < .0001). The clean
cartoon condition showed no such advantage (M sad = 3.25, M disgust = 3.27, t = 0.65,
p = 0.51).
These results were independent of participants’ gender (p > .65 for all interactions
involving gender). Thus, contrary to gender stereotypes, men are not alone in finding
humor funnier when they have been disgusted. There was, however, a main effect
of sex on enjoyment of the dirty cartoons (Mmale = 3.15, M female = 2.87, t = 8.16,
p <.0001). There was no difference between the sexes in enjoyment of the clean
cartoons (Mmale = 3.11, M female = 3.14, t = 1.09, p = .28).
The results were independent of the baseline funniness of the cartoons, F (1,275)
= 1.15, p = .28 for the interaction. Disgust and sadness enhanced the funniness
of cartoons that were considered not particularly funny (below 2) in the control


















Figure 2.5: The influence of two distinct negative emotions on humor, compared to
neutral. Incidental disgust and sadness both led to higher ratings of funniness of
clean and dirty cartoons. Whiskers represent the standard error.
2.2 Study 2: Moral violations
The previous experiment demonstrated that two negatively valenced low arousal
emotions, disgust and sadness, increase the perceived funniness of cartoons. Given
that these emotions typically foster negative evaluations of targets, this seems to
indicate that negative emotions have effects which are flexible and contingent on
circumstance. We don’t yet have a good idea of what the bounds of this effect are,
however: can low arousal negative emotions enhance funniness ratings even when the
target of judgment is itself not a comedy item?
Previous research has shown that disgust increases moral disapproval, although
many of the stimuli that have been used in this research are potentially humorous.
In the classic “footbridge” problem, one must decide whether it is acceptable to
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knock a fat man off a bridge to save the lives of five workmen who are about to
be hit by a trolley (Greene, Morelli, Lowenberg, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2008; Thomson,
1976). Other stories that have been used by moral psychologists depict men pleasuring
themselves with kittens (Schnall, Haidt, et al., 2008) and masturbating into chicken
carcasses (Haidt, Koller, & Dias, 1993). We will refer to such stories as ridiculous
moral violations, or RMVs. While RMVs can be thought of as serious moral problems
when in the right frame of mind, they also contain comedic elements, such as slapstick,
absurdity, and bawdiness.
Disgust has previously been shown to increase moral disapprobation for RMVs
(Wheatley & Haidt, 2005; Schnall, Haidt, et al., 2008). Effects such as these have
led researchers to characterize disgust as a “moralizing” emotion—one that deepens
moral engagement (Horberg et al., 2009). If this is true, then disgust should make
moral violations appear more serious, thereby decreasing our ability to see them as
funny. On the other hand, if the informational value of disgust changes depending on
the task, then we might expect disgust to increase the funniness of moral violations
when one is asked to evaluate them on that dimension. The existence of judgment
stimuli that have the potential for both hilarity and offense provide a particularly
strong test for hedonic disgust, since all variables, aside from the frame the subject
brings to bear on the task, can be kept constant.
2.2.1 Ridiculous Moral Violation (RMV) Selection
42 RMVs were developed (Appendix B). These were either copied wholesale from
studies in the moral psychology literature, modified to be more humorous (e.g., the
inclusion of a non-sequitur or ribald detail), or written from scratch, imitating this
general style.
In order to determine the RMVs that had the most potential for humor, 41 par-
ticipants (age 18-33, 39% male) from the University of Michigan participated in a
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norming study. Half the participants rated the RMVs for funniness, and half rated
them for wrongness. The order of stories was randomized between subjects. Re-
sponses were measured on a scale from 1 (“Not funny at all” or “Not wrong at all”)
to 6 (“Very funny” or “Very wrong”). The study took approximately 20 minutes.
For the priming experiment, we removed stories that had a mean funniness rating
of less than two, leaving 20 of the original RMVs. The RMVs exhibited a fair degree
of variation in wrongness (see Appendix B for details).
2.2.2 Methods
The experimental design was similar to that used in Study 1, except there were
20 trials: 20 sentence primes (either disgust or neutral, as before) and 20 RMVs.
The order of trials was randomized between subjects, with sentence and RMV placed
together in fixed random pairs (appearing on separate pages). Each RMV was rated
for funniness on a 1–6 scale.
94 participants (American, age 17-67, 40% male) were run in the 15-minute paid
online study. At the end of the experiment, participants were asked what they thought
the study was about. Six participants (about 6%) opined that the sentences might
have been meant to influence the judgment in some way, but none of them specifically
identified disgust, mood, or emotion as a critical factor in the manipulation. Since
removing these participants did not affect the overall results, these data were retained
in the analysis.
2.2.3 Results and discussion
An independent samples t-test revealed a significant effect of disgust increasing
the judged funniness of ridiculous moral violations, t(91) = 2.49, p = .01, d = .51
(Figure 2.6). As in the previous experiment, there was no interaction effect with the













Figure 2.6: Results from the Ridiculous Moral Violation experiment (§ 2.2.3). Disgust
primes lead to higher ratings of funniness for moral violations. Whiskers represent
the standard error by subject.
This finding serves as a conceptual replication of the previous experiment, that
a low arousal negative emotion can enhance judgments of funniness. It also demon-
strates that disgust increases humor perception even when when evaluating scenarios
containing serious moral violations.
2.3 Discussion
A longstanding puzzle in humor research has been whether the tendentious sub-
ject matter frequently featured in humor contributes to enjoyment, and if so, what
aspects of these emotional elements are responsible for enhancing amusement. Previ-
ous researchers have either suggested that these emotional elements play a minimal
role (Koestler, 1964), or are only due to transfer of excitation (Shurcliff, 1968; Can-
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tor et al., 1974). However, our results show that two low-arousal negative emotions,
disgust and sadness, can enhance the funniness of cartoons and moral violations.
This suggests that arousal alone is not enough to account for the appeal of strong
emotional content in humor.
These studies also represent the first experimental evidence that incidental dis-
gust can improve the evaluation of a target, and are among the first showing that
sadness can have such an effect. The rendering of a more positive judgment by a neg-
ative emotions provides evidence against the idea that emotion exerts an influence
on downstream processes that must be congruent with the emotion’s valence or core
themes (Bower, 1981; Lazarus, 1991; Lerner, Small, & Loewenstein, 2004; Horberg,
Oveis, & Keltner, 2011). These results can be better understood within the feelings-
as-information framework, where emotions exert their influence in a way that reflects
the meaning they have in a particular context (Schwarz, 2012).
In spite of the gains that these new studies make for our understanding of humor
and emotion, our data leave open several questions.
First, while previous work suggests that sadness and disgust are low arousal,
we did not test our stimuli for how psychologically or physiologically arousing they
were. Many emotions have the capacity to vary in their arousal level; for example,
depression and despair have different arousal levels, despite both being classifiable
as a subtype of sadness (Russell & Bullock, 1985; Fontaine et al., 2007). Typically,
sadness and disgust correspond to a similar level of arousal as an emotionally neutral
state, or slightly below it (Levenson et al., 1990; Fontaine et al., 2007), but we did not
take measures of whether this also holds true for the emotion primes used in these
studies. Nonetheless, we have no reason to believe that our verbal stimuli would
represent a departure from the emotion induction methods used by other researchers
to measure arousal, which include remembering or reliving past experiences (Smith
& Ellsworth, 1985; Ekman et al., 1983), guiding facial expressions (Levenson et al.,
30
1990), or viewing images or film (Bradley, Greenwald, Petry, & Lang, 1992; Vianna
& Tranel, 2006).
A related concern is that, while we know that our disgust and sadness primes
elicited the target emotion based on self-report (and priming in the food domain for
disgust), we cannot say with certainty what aspect or aspects of our primes caused the
jump in funniness ratings, and whether other negative stimuli would show the same
effect. Sadness and disgust differ from neutral states on more than one dimension.
One of these dimensions is negative affect, but the effect could equally well be driven
by emotional intensity, the interestingness of the sentences (interest, arguably, being
an emotion in its own right), or some other factor. Pinpointing what it is about sad-
ness and disgust that leads to increased levels of amusement will be key to informing
the question of why negative contents shows up so frequently in humorous contexts.
One might be tempted to attribute our results to a contrast effect: perhaps the dis-
gust and sadness primes provide a negative baseline against which subsequent stimuli
are perceived more favorably. Arguing against this possibility is the observation that
negative emotion primes led to higher evaluations for some pleasant stimuli (cartoons)
and lower evaluations for others (food). Furthermore, the disgust primes did not have
a diminished effect on stimuli that were in some ways unpleasant themselves—the
moral violations and the disgusting cartoons—and would thus be expected to lead to
lower contrast.
Perhaps there is something specifically about contrasts in a humorous context.
Broadly speaking, “contrasts” of some sort are found in many forms of humor (as
with irony, puns, bathos, and absurdity), and many theories consider violations of
expectation to be a key feature of humor (Koestler, 1964; Berlyne, 1972; Apter, 1982;
Hurley et al., 2011). Perhaps there is a mild sense of absurdity that accompanies
the act of descrambling unpleasant sentences and then being asked to rate cartoons
and moral violations, and this is reflected in the subjects’ ratings. Contrast may be
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a feature of humor perception.
It’s possible (even likely) that the disgusting sentences are themselves slightly
funny (viz. Rozin et al.’s (2010) observation that disgusting stimuli can elicit nervous
laughter). This might shed light on the mechanism (i.e. that feelings of mirth emerge
even before the joke is presented), but it merely pushes back the question: why are
these aversive stimuli seen as funny? It would also not explain why the sad sentences
have a comparable effect.
One surprise in our data was a failure to find a specific effect of emotion by
cartoon category. Disgust would seem to be especially apt for judging dirty jokes,
yet its influence in this context was no stronger than it was for clean jokes. The
only interaction effect we uncovered has no obvious explanation: sadness enhanced
the dirty cartoons to a greater degree than did disgust. Earlier attempts at finding
interactions between emotion and humor type have been mixed. Sometimes they
succeed (Strickland (1959) found that anger increases appreciation of hostile but not
neutral humor) but sometimes they fail (Cantor et al., 1974). The mild unpleasantness
or emotional intensity brought on by sad and disgusting primes may signal a successful
joke largely independent of the joke’s content. Future testing will be needed to figure
out under which circumstances emotional states give rise to differential impact on
humor.
A feature of the mood induction used here is its relatively mild emotional impact.
An open question for future research is what our results would look like as the degree of
negativity in emotion primes is modulated. We might expect a U-shaped curve, where
discomfort or intensity increases the enjoyability of a joke, after which it can become
too unpleasant and have an adverse effect. Although previous research has failed to
uncover a such a U-shaped curve for arousal in humor appreciation (Strohminger, in
press), there may be one for negative affect. This would be consistent with recent
findings showing that some amount of distance is required to find tragedy funny
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(McGraw & Warren, 2010), and the observation that benign masochistic activities
are self-reported to be pleasurable only up to a certain threshold, after which they
become aversive (Rozin, Guillot, Fincher, & Rozin, 2010).
Although disgust and sadness are both negative emotions, whether they lead to
positive or negative judgments depends on the context in which they are placed. In
a humorous context, both emotions appear to increase appreciation of humor. Such
diagonal effects may not be limited to our assessment of comedy, however. In the




Disgust as a Vehicle of Aesthetic Pleasure
Most of the negative emotions—such as the sadness evinced by tragedies, or fear
in the face of natural wonders—have been defended or lauded by aesthetician over the
years (Kant, 1790/1987; Burke, 1759/1998; Mendelssohn, 1997; Lessing, 1874/2005).
But disgust, in spite of its ubiquity in cultural forms like the dirty joke, has typically
been left out of this pantheon (Korsmeyer, 2011).1
While other unpleasant sentiments aroused by art can be fictionalized, abstracted,
or transformed (for example, fear into the sublime) disgust resists any such refinement.
Kant (1790/1987) writes:
There is only one kind of ugliness that cannot be presented in conformity
with nature without obliterating all aesthetic liking and hence artistic
beauty; that ugliness which arouses disgust. For in that strange sensation,
which rests on nothing but imagination, the object is presented as if it
insisted, as it were, on our enjoying it even though that is just what we
are forcefully resisting; and hence the artistic presentation of the object
is no longer distinguished in our sensation from the nature of this object
itself, so that it cannot possibly be considered beautiful.
1The dismissal of disgust by aestheticians mirrors the tendency of psychologists in the 20th
century to ignore disgust. In both cases, this decision appears to stem from the belief that disgust
is base and non-cognitive: not really an emotion so much as a drive, akin to hunger or lust. Disgust
is, in some ways, the most bodily of the emotions, and earlier scholars noted that its chief conduit
is through the baser senses of smell and taste. But disgust does has a cognitive component, like any
other full-fledged emotion. And by some accounts its cognitive dimensions are quite complex, even
unusually contemplative (Miller, 1997; Kolnai, Korsmeyer, & Smith, 2003; Korsmeyer, 2011).
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This basic view is echoed in other works: since aesthetic disgust arouses the “real”
emotion, and not a mimesis of it, it is crass, objectionable, and ill-suited to true art
(Burke, 1759/1998; Mendelssohn, 1997). When the grotesque in art is approved of,
it’s only to the extent that the work can be appreciated intellectually, as a display of
virtuosity:
“Who will wish to paint you, when no one wishes to see you?” says an old
epigrammatist concerning an extremely misshapen man. Many a more
modern artist would say, “Be you as misshapen as is possible, I will paint
you nevertheless. Though, indeed, no one may wish to see you, people
will still wish to see my picture; not in so far as it represents you, but in
so far as it is a demonstration of my art, which knows how to make so
good a likeness of such a monster.” Lessing (1874/2005, p. 8)
Disgust qua disgust has no place in art, or the beaux arts, anyway.
What’s perplexing about this resistance is that art history is littered with work
that is seemingly designed to disgust and disturb—what we will refer to here as
grotesque art. The grotesque pops up in everything from religious iconography (such
as the Passion and Crucifixion) to the gamepiece and vanitas still lifes, to more
modern provocateurs like Damien Hirst’s cows and sharks suspended in formaldehyde.
To all appearances, pleasurable disgust experiences are not limited to dirty jokes,
zombie flicks, and other preoccupations of the hoi polloi. It is only very recently,
though, that any serious attention has been paid to the possibility that disgust can
deepen our appreciation of fine art (Korsmeyer, 2011).
I mention this debate not because I aim to resolve the question of whether disgust
can be a “real” aesthetic emotion, suited to the higher planes of being, but to show
that scholars have long noted that the existence of disgust in art poses a peculiar
problem for aesthetic enjoyment, and have struggled with how to explain it (or explain
it away). Philosophers’ bemusement at the existence of these phenomena is reflected
in their terminology for it: the paradox of horror, the paradox of tragedy, the paradox
of aversion. (Even the related term in psychology, benign masochism, tries to tuck the
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solution into its name: it’s benign, so it doesn’t really count as masochism.) Solutions
to this paradox can be roughly divided into two camps: those arguing that disgust
exists in art in spite of itself, and those that say we genuinely enjoy the sensation of
disgust.
Carroll (1990) addresses this paradox by stating that the disgust and fear we
experience in the horror, while unpleasant, is not as bad as the pleasure we take
in curiosity and interest from the situation, such that the pros outweigh the cons:
“The disgust that [monsters] evince might be seen as part of the price to be paid for
the pleasure of their disclosure” (p. 184). Korsmeyer (2011) also places the locus
of enjoyment in disgust’s ability to draw our attention and morbid fascination—on
this view, rubbernecking may be seen as one of the core components of disgust’s
behavioral repertoire. She goes so far as to argue that aesthetic disgust does not even
constitute a negative sensation, such that there is therefore no ‘paradox’ to solve.
To a certain extent, psychological theories have sought to solve this paradox the
same way, citing a higher intellectual engagement with the stimuli as the explanation
for our ability to enjoy them. Rozin, Guillot, et al. (2010) states this quite explic-
itly, saying that benign masochism stems from “pleasure at ’mind over body’” (p.1).
Likewise, Bloom (2010) suggests that the unpleasantness is only withstood insofar
as the relief it provides afterwards: “the initial pain might be worthwhile because
it’s outweighed by the later pleasure” (p. 195). These discussions are not as fully
articulated as the parallel theories in philosophy, and it could be argued that they are
at least partly agnostic on the question of where the pleasure derives from. (Bloom,
for instance, breezily entertains several theories in his book on pleasure, without
advocating for any of them particularly strongly.)
Gaut, by contrast, has argued that disgust and other negative emotions can be,
in themselves, enjoyable (Gaut, 1993). We can, after all, leave a horror movie being
disappointed it was not gory enough (while still being plenty interesting). Even Burke
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(1759/1998), who rejects the notion that disgust can awaken any proper aesthetic
sensibility, places the locus of these thrills in negative sensations. He points out that
most people would prefer attending a public execution over a Sophocles play (the
moral prohibition against gawking at gory public executions is a relatively recent
phenomenon). At an execution, the violence is not imaginary, and this element of
realness and immediacy is the very reason for its heightened entertainment value.
And in spite of Rozin’s cognitivist stance on benign masochism, his studies indicate
that people’s favorite aversive pursuits are those that are only just beneath the most
intense sensation they can stand, suggesting that people are seeking out, at least at
some level, the negative sensation itself.
The question of whether negative sensation itself affords any thrill unto itself
in aesthetic experiences, and whether disgust in particular can enhance aesthetic
experiences, is, of course, subject to empirical scrutiny. Very little experimental work
exists on this matter however. L. Martin et al. (1997) found that inducing sadness
increased liking for sad stories (but not happy stories). More recently, a study has
shown that fear, but not arousal, enhanced enjoyment of abstract paintings (Eskine,
Kacinik, & Prinz, 2012).2 This supports Burke’s basic observation that aesthetic awe
and the sublime originate in the negative emotion of fear.
Up to this point, no one has looked at whether disgust can enhance aesthetic
enjoyment, particularly for fine art. To do this, we ran a set of emotion induction
experiments to see whether, and under what conditions, disgust leads to enhanced
aesthetic experiences. These studies aim to collectively illuminate how disgust inter-
faces with different types of art, why it is we sometimes like ugly or unpleasant art,
and what level of flexibility this emotion has in an aesthetic context. As with the
humor studies in the previous chapter, a demonstration that incidental disgust can
lead to a more positive evaluation would pose a fairly major problem for theories of




3.1 Initial study: Abstract art
The above discussion notwithstanding, there are good reasons to predict that dis-
gust could only lead to unfavorable aesthetic judgments. Indeed, my prediction when
I first turned to these matters was that disgust would work on aesthetic judgments
as it does on morality. There is a long history in philosophy of drawing comparisons
between—if not actually equating—the ethical and the aesthetical. Hume (1875),
for instance, argues that moral and aesthetic judgment both essentially boil down to
the subjective feeling states that we have in response to them. So, not only do we
rely heavily (perhaps exclusively) on emotional responses for both types of judgment,
but the judgment itself is constituted by the same basic process. In a similar vein,
Shaftesbury (1711/1999) held that virtue is a subtype of beauty, and that moral ap-
preciation is, in essence, a form of aesthetic appreciation. More recent philosophers
have detailed the various commonalities between aesthetic and moral judgments, in
order to show that aesthetic realism is tenable on many of the same grounds as moral
realism (Railton, 2001). A new wave of psychologists, taking a cue from Hume, have
argued that moral preferences are akin to aesthetic preferences insofar as they are
feeling-based and not penetrable to reason; the only difference between these two
forms of preference is that we are more motivated to come up with post hoc ratio-
nalizations for our moral preferences (Zajonc, 1980; Haidt, 2001; Ditto, Pizarro, &
Tannenbaum, 2009).
Consistent with views articulated by Hume, Shaftesbury, and Railton, a recent
study found that children consider statements like ‘grapes are yummy’ and ‘swingsets
are fun’ to be a matter of subjective taste, but when it comes to moral and aesthetic
claims—such as whether it’s wrong to hurt someone or whether roses are beautiful—
children believe there is a single, objective truth (Nichols & Folds-Bennett, 2003).
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This suggests that, developmentally, aesthetic evaluations are treated as objective,
universal, and preference-independent in the same way that moral evaluations are.
Testing an adult population, Goodwin and Darley (2008) found that people were more
likely to say there was an objective truth to moral than aesthetic claims, although
this pattern may have been due to the fact that the aesthetic statements were framed
as a comparison between two, potentially incomparable, evaluations (“Classical music
is better than rock music”) rather than a judgment about the objectivity of a single
statement (“Assisting in the death of a terminally ill friend is morally permissible”).
The link between moral and aesthetic evaluation appears in other forms as well.
The language of moral and aesthetic evaluation is co-mingled (both moral deeds and
art works can be ‘offensive’ or ‘in good taste’). Bad art is often seen as not just an
affront to good taste but to moral propriety, and boundary-pushing art is regularly
accompanied by moral outrage: a cast of Senators famously petitioned the NEA in
1989 for funding the homoerotic photography of Robert Mapplethorpe and Andres
Serrano’s Piss Christ (a crucifix floating in a jar of ‘urine’), referring to the creations
as “morally reprehensible trash” (Summers, 2004). Sensation, a show of the Saatchi
collection that toured the world in the late 1990s, brought controversy in practically
every city it landed; Mayor Giuliani referred to the exhibit (which included Chris
Olifi’s dung-spattered painting of the Virgin Mary) as “sick stuff”, and tried to cut
public funding of the museum that hosted it (Young, 2005). Nor is this a uniquely
modern phenomenon; Edouard Manet’s now tame-seeming depiction of an imperious
courtesan, Olympia, was derided as “vulgar” and “immoral” when it debuted in 1863
(Richardson, Manet, & Adler, 1998). Mirroring the social history of art, there is a rich
literature in philosophy debating the question of whether morally wicked art can even
be aesthetically good, providing further evidence for the cognitive blur between our
moral and aesthetic responses to artwork (Hume (1875); Carroll (1996); Gaut (2007);
Hanson (2001); although see Kant (1790/1987); Jacobson (1997); Kieran (2006)).
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Figure 3.1: Manet’s outrageous Olympia.
The scandal stemmed not from the pros-
titute’s nudity, but from the lack of ideal-
ization, and her unapologetically superior
gaze.
If moral and aesthetic judgments are so closely overlapping, especially in how they
make use of feeling state information, then the inferences we make about art when
we feel disgusted should be comparable to the inferences we make about moral acts
in this state. It does not seem unreasonable to imagine that the disgust that viewers
felt when first gazing upon Piss Christ or Olympia for the first time was driving both
their judgment of the work as aesthetically valueless and as a moral abomination.3 If,
on the other hand, we fail to find such a reliable relationship, this would be evidence
that aesthetic judgments are not as comparable to moral judgments as is sometimes
argued.
As a starting point, I selected paintings in the abstract expressionist style. The
generic, non-representational nature of these paintings suits an exploratory analysis,
as it is fairly content-agnostic, and invites the viewer to interpret the work in an
open-ended fashion. See Figure 3.2 for a couple of representative examples of the
paintings used.
3.1.1 Methods
This study was chiefly designed as a pilot study to see if disgust could make
cartoons funnier. We wanted to be able to show that the disgust stimuli would not
always have a salutary effect, so we included a block where people rated food pictures.
3The possibility that disgust could potentiate both moral offense and aesthetic appreciation over
a work of art is taken up in Section 3.4, below.)
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Wassily Kandinsky, Composition VIII (1923) Franz Kline, Painting (1952)
Figure 3.2: Two of the abstract paintings used in the studies appearing in Sections 3.1
and 3.2.
We also included a block that contained moral scenarios, so we could compare our
results to what was, at the time, a new effect in the literature, that disgust makes
moral judgments more severe (Wheatley & Haidt, 2005; Schnall, Haidt, et al., 2008).
A fourth condition included paintings to be used in aesthetic judgments.
132 undergraduates from the University of Michigan spent an hour in the lab for
course credit. Participants were told the study was on whether linguistic abilities
can account for individual differences in everyday preferences. Three subjects were
excluded from the analysis due to missing data—the computer crashed before they
could finish.
The experiment was arranged into two overarching blocks, with the one half of
trials containing neutral primes, and the other half containing disgust primes. Emo-
tion was thus manipulated within subject. Whether the disgust primes appeared
in the first or second half of the experiment was counterbalanced between subjects.
Within an emotion block, there were four sets of judgment trials as outlined above
(cartoons, food, art, moral scenarios), with fifteen trials each. Order of judgment
block (whether in first, second, third, or fourth ordinal position within the emotional
block) was counterbalanced between subjects, but repeated across the two emotion
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blocks within subjects. Although the order of items within judgment block was ran-
domized between subjects, the items that appeared within an emotion block did not
change. That is, the same set of paintings always appeared in the disgust condition,
and this was distinct and nonoverlapping with the set of paintings that appeared in
the neutral condition.
For each of the four types of judgment, there were 15 trials in the disgust prime
condition, 15 trials in the neutral prime condition. For aesthetic judgments, each
trial consisted of a scrambled sentence the subject had to descramble, followed, on
the next screen, by a painting with a rating scale: “How much do you like this
painting?” on a scale from 1 (“I hate it”) to 6 (“I love it”). For moral judgments, the
judgment screen contained a short moral dilemma (based on those used in Greene,
Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2001) on a scale from 1 (“Forbidden”) to 6
(“Completely permissible”). For gustatory judgments, the judgment screen displayed
a full-color photograph of food, on a scale from 1 (“Not at all appetizing”) to 6 (“Very
appetizing”). For humor judgments, the judgment screen displayed a dirty cartoon.4
To minimize the chance that subjects would discern the true purpose of the study,
only half of the sentences in the disgust condition had disgust-related content (the
other half were neutral). In the neutral condition, all of the sentences were neutral.
3.1.2 Results
Contrary to predictions, a paired t-test revealed that paintings were reliably en-
joyed more in the disgust condition (M disgust = 3.16) than the paintings in the neutral
condition (M neutral = 3.01; paired t(128) = 3.14, p = .002; Cohen’s d = .19). See
Figure 3.3.
Cartoons were also liked more in the disgust than the neutral conditions (M disgust
430 cartoons from the New Yorker corpus were used. To increase the chances of finding an effect,
only dirty cartoons were used, as we thought disgust would be most likely to have a salutary effect
for jokes that were already disgusting.
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= 3.30, M neutral = 2.96; paired t(127) = 7.74, p <.00001; Cohen’s d = .38). However,
the validity of this comparison was later called into question; see below.
Food images, as one might imagine, were liked less when subjects had been dis-
gusted (emphMdisgust = 3.21, M neutral = 3.94; paired t(128) = 14.28, p <.00001;
Cohen’s d = 1.02). Of all the emotion priming manipulations performed for my dis-
sertation, this was easily the strongest and most reliable effect. This is likely because
feeling disgusted when surrounded by food sends the clearest and most unambiguous
message about what the emotional state signifies. For all of disgust’s flexibility—
the ability to be applied metaphorically or ironically to a variety of judgments and
preferences—disgust nevertheless retains a primary and specialized function, which
is to avoid pathogens, especially through oral contamination (Rozin & Fallon, 1987;
Rozin, Haidt, & Fincher, 2009).
The morality condition yielded a null effect (M disgust = 2.88, M neutral = 2.81;
paired t(127) = 1.34, p = .18). There are a variety of reasons we might have failed
to find that disgust makes moral judgments more severe, an effect which has been
demonstrated by other researchers (Wheatley & Haidt, 2005; Schnall, Haidt, et al.,
2008; Inbar, Pizarro, & Bloom, 2012; Horberg et al., 2009). The pattern even in the
published record shows an inconsistent efficacy of disgust priming on moral judgment.
For example, Horberg et al. (2009) found that disgust amplified moral repugnance
only when the moral scenario contained a purity violation. Wheatley and Haidt (2005)
and Schnall, Haidt, et al. (2008) found that induced disgust only affected a subset of
the moral judgments tested, though there was no demonstrable pattern of whether
the violations were related to purity or not. Finally, Inbar et al. (2012) found that
disgusting smells had a deleterious effect on judgments of male homosexual behavior,
but no effect on evaluations of gay women. As research in this area progresses, it
may turn out that the complexity and variability of higher-level evaluations such as
those involved in moral judgment, combined with the multiplicative determinacy of
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emotion states, lead to emotion-cognition relationships that cannot be summed up
by neat rules such as “disgust = moral disapprobation”. Determining the boundary
conditions on these effects will likely be a key challenge of the field in the coming
years.
While intriguing, this study has several limitations. One of these is that the
wording of the anchors for the aesthetic judgment (from “I hate it” to “I love it”) are
non-standard for a scaled question, and may encourage responses artificially clustered
around the midpoint, due to their extremity (Schwarz, 1995). Additionally, the inter-
leaving of different judgment types could have had some unanticipated contamination
effects on judgment. If anything, this should have weakened the effects rather than
potentiated them; still, ideally we would be able to observe this effect in a population
that had only been making a single type of judgment.
Another design issue is the stimuli were in fixed random order within emotion
condition: the same 15 paintings always appeared in the neutral condition, and a
different set always appeared in the disgust condition. This raises the possibility that
the observed effects were completely due to the serendipitous placement of preferred
judgment stimuli in one emotion induction condition block over the other. Indeed,
subsequent analyses revealed that the cartoons in the disgust condition had a higher
mean funniness rating, according to norming data taken earlier that semester from
the same student population.5 However, this fear can be allayed for the aesthetics
condition, as a subsequent norming study (Section 3.3.2) revealed that the paintings
in the neutral condition were actually liked more than the other fifteen (but not
significantly so; M disgust = 3.52, M neutral = 3.60). Although the population providing
the norming data come from online subjects, who are demographically more diverse
than the present study’s sample of midwestern undergraduates, this at least provides
5The author, in her zeal for data collection, had only made sure that the cartoons all had high
ranking on funniness, not that the cartoons, when partitioned into two groups, were equally funny.
The results discussed in Chapter II are the product of an improved version of the study, with cartoons

































































































Figure 3.3: An overview of the results of the pilot study. All within-judgment emotion
priming comparisons were significant except for morality; see text for details.
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a sanity check that the paintings randomly placed in the experimental condition did
not radically differ from those in the control condition.
Finally, the range of paintings used to elicit aesthetic judgments was quite narrow,
and it is not clear whether this effect would generalize to other types of art. Abstract
art is often intended to challenge the viewer; in this context, feeling disgust may
be interpreted as being disquieted or upset in a way that is congruent with the
intended impact of the artwork. On the other hand, disgust might disrupt enjoyment
of paintings that are intended to be happy, uncomplicated, or serene. This matter is
taken up in the next study.
3.2 Abstract versus landscape art
Earlier, we highlighted the point that, if aesthetic judgment really is like moral
judgment, then the inferences we make from feeling states should be comparable in
both. There appear to be at least two major differences in the use of emotion between
moral and aesthetic judgment. The first relates to the informational value of a lack
of emotional response. If I fail to have a strong emotional reaction to a proposal
of moral import, I may conclude that I am agnostic on the issue—that is, I fail to
form a negative moral evaluation. By contrast, a lack of emotional engagement with
an artwork signifies dullness and a failure to entertain, which would work against a
favorable aesthetic response.
Another difference is that art, in contrast to moral acts, has a broader range of
emotional states that signify success or greatness. When we watch The Shining, our
feeling of dread as Danny pedals through the hotel corridor is what leads us to like
this scene; yet our enjoyment when John Cleese holds forth on the finer points of
ex-parrots is governed by a completely different emotional response, mirth.
While it may be the case that a wider range of emotional states are acceptable
for aesthetic judgments, it may still be true that these emotional states can suit cer-
46
tain aesthetic contexts better than others. So, if Danny’s pedaling seemed suddenly
and unaccountably ridiculous, this would break the spell of tension that Kubrick
had worked so hard to construct, thereby leading us to conclude that the scene was
clumsy rather than masterful. Thus it is quite possible that preferences for emotional
states vary depending on the the stage that has already been set by the artwork, and
whatever other assumptions and cultural knowledge the viewer imports to it (Liao,
Strohminger, & Sripada, 2012). The exact way these responses work is undoubt-
edly complex; nonetheless, we can take some opening stabs at figuring them out by
examining the simplest, clearest-cut cases first.
Thus, the next study was designed to look at two sets of art from which we would
expect distinct feeling state responses: abstract expressionist paintings, and 19th
century landscapes, mostly from the French Neoclassical and Hudson River schools.6
It is possible that disgust would selectively interrupt aesthetic experiences that are
designed to be pleasant, welcoming, and serene.
3.2.1 Methods
89 undergraduates (M age = 19.9, 72% female) at the University of Michigan were
run in a 45 minute-long study.
The abstract painting corpus was expanded to 60 paintings (from the original 30),
along with 60 landscape paintings. Emotion was induced with a sentence descram-
bling task placed between each judgment trial. The same sentences used in the pilot
study were used; as before, only half of the sentences in the disgust condition were
disgust-related. Painting type (abstract or landscape) and emotion prime (disgust or
neutral) were manipulated within subject. This 2 x 2 design was broken into four,
6While these paintings were selected for their more traditional and straightforwardly pleasant
properties, in retrospect, some of them make actually arouse fear-related emotions, akin to awe
and the sublime, owing to their depiction of vast, expansive vistas and their sometimes haunting
or portentous use of light (Burke, 1759/1998). Nonetheless, these are the most straightforwardly
pleasant and ‘positive’ artworks investigated here, and provide a reasonably good counterpoint to
more expressly disturbing and unusual artworks.
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Albert Bierstadt, Storm in the Mountains
(ca. 1870)
Gustave Courbet, River Landscape (1869)
Figure 3.4: Two examples of the landscapes used in the study appearing in Sec-
tions 3.2. On the left, a Hudson River school painting; on the right, a quintessential
neoclassical landscape.
hierarchically-arranged blocks that were counterbalanced between subjects. Partici-
pants would unscramble a sentence in one emotion condition followed by a rating of
one type of painting, repeat this process for 30 trials, then move to the other paint-
ing block within the same emotion condition for 30 trials, before switching to the
other emotion condition for the final 60 trials (the switching of conditions was not
announced or otherwise explicitly signaled to subjects).
Participants rated paintings according to the question, “How much do you like
this painting?” with anchors at 1 (“Not at all”) and 6 (“Very much”). Whether
a painting appeared in the disgust or neutral condition was randomized between
subjects (although the painting could appear only once throughout the course of the
experiment. There were 120 trials in all. Afterwards, participants completed some
personality and demographics questionnaires.
3.2.2 Results
To analyze the effect of of emotion prime on aesthetic judgment, we used a mixed-


























Figure 3.5: The influence of disgust on two different painting types; disgust enhanced
enjoyment of abstract but not landscape paintings.
Lewis, & Meyer, 2011 for a comparable analysis). The model treats paintings (and
subjects) as part of a larger population, rather than the entire population of relevant
stimuli. Using such a model allows us to partial out noise that a standard ANOVA
would be unable to detect. Effects for the abstract painting were marginally significant
in the predicted direction (M disgust = 2.61, M neutral = 2.55; t = 1.84, p = .06; see
Figure 3.5).
Disgust had no coherent effect on evaluations of landscape paintings (M disgust =
3.44, M neutral = 3.41; using a mixed effects model, t = 1.16, p = .25). Nor was there
a significant interaction in the emotion’s influence among painting types when both
painting conditions were compared in the same model (p = .61). There was however
a dramatic main effect of painting type on liking; perhaps unsurprisingly, abstract
squiggles and washes of color are not as popular as depictions of bucolic splendor
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(t = 8.90, p <.00001). These two findings may be linked, at least in some indirect
way. Perhaps when art has already engendered a strong positive response, it cannot
be perturbed by a (relatively weak) incidental disgust prime. Or, perhaps the most
enjoyable landscapes in the corpus are harmed by the presence of disgust, whereas
the less enjoyable ones behave more like the abstract paintings. The available data do
not allow anything beyond speculation, unfortunately, this condition collapses across
landscapes which vary on attractiveness.
These results allow a few provisional conclusions. First, with the randomization
problem dispensed with, as well as a fresh influx of abstract paintings, we can rest
assured that the effect originally discovered in the last study is replicable. Second,
we can toss out the idea that disgust necessarily disrupts enjoyment of art that is
only meant to elicit positive emotions. The weakness of these effects is, of course,
unsatisfying. We wondered whether disgust would have a more reliable effect on
aesthetic judgments of art that was intended specifically to elicit disgust in the viewer.
In the next study, we set out to test how feelings of disgust influence our appreciation
of the grotesque.
3.3 Grotesque art
Some art is expressly designed to disgust the viewer. For such art, disgust primes
may be especially potent, as this emotion would send a more unambiguous signal of
the efficacy of artwork. Furthermore, if we can show that disgust enhances grotesque
art, we would have some empirical basis for characterizing why this art moves us,
and the role of negative feelings in our appreciation of it (and whether there is indeed
such a role, a point that some have denied; Carroll, 1990).
How disgust influences aesthetic judgment may turn on a variety of details about
the artwork, so this study also set out to be systematic in its approach (or as sys-
tematic as possible, given the subject matter). The artwork used in the first two
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studies was not systematically vetted or normed, leaving open many questions about
which aspects of the art are influencing how disgust is incorporated into the judg-
ment. Therefore, this study collected norming data on both the older set of abstract
and landscape paintings, and on a new corpus of grotesque art. This would gives us
an empirical basis for selecting stimuli in later studies; these scores can also be used
as predictors for the magnitude and direction of the priming effects.
3.3.1 Gathering the stimuli
The corpus of grotesque art was compiled by combing through approximately 100
art books containing full-color (where relevant) plates. For the most part, these books
were gathered by drawing on the author’s knowledge of art history. This was sup-
plemented by the judicious use of keywords in searching the library database. Once
the paintings had been selected, they were digitally scanned into high resolution elec-
tronic files. The art is mostly paintings and other two-dimensional media, although
there is also a smattering of sculpture. The art is largely European and American
in origin, although a handful of Asian and African art made its way into the corpus.
All told, the corpus contains 473 artworks spanning seven centuries (from the 15th
to the 21st), and represents 143 artists, a fair portion of whom are firmly entrenched
in the Western canon (Bosch, Bruegel, Rubens, Goya, Dali, Magritte, Dix, and so
forth). Some of the art in the corpus would be familiar even to someone with no art
training (Munch’s The Scream, Dali’s The Persistence of Time), and very little of it
would be unfamiliar to a person with a college-level education in art history (I say
this as a person with a college-level education in art history).
This norming study also aimed to collect norming data about the extant abstract
and landscape paintings. Comparatively speaking, our methods for collecting these
pieces was less exhaustive. However, the goal of norming the the abstract and land-
scape paintings was only to aid in accounting for the effects in the studies that had
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already been run, so there was no need to expand upon the original 60 abstract and
60 landscape paintings.
3.3.2 Norming the stimuli
The norming project was divided into three different studies, and posted online.
Subjects were recruited from mTurk. The same subject could sign up for all three
studies if they wished. Since the time and IP address is stamped on each row of data,
one could look at who participated in multiple studies, and what kinds of relationships
exist among reactions to these various forms of art. We did not, however, analyze
this aspect of the data.
3.3.2.1 Grotesque norming
156 American subjects participated; they are 64% female, Mdn age = 29, and hail
from 36 states.
Of the original 473 items in the grotesque art corpus, 445 were included in the
norming study. Sculptures and overly repetitious artwork by the same artist were
excluded.
In light of the formidable number of items to be rated, the study was designed
to select a random subset of 120 paintings. Each subject rated the painting on six
questions: how much they liked the art, and how interesting, novel, funny, disturbing,
disgusting, and offensive they found it. The scale was from 1 (“Not at all”) to 6
(“Very”, or, for the liking question, “Very much”). Subjects would answer all six
questions about the artwork before moving to the next one.
There were a few reasons we cared about the ‘Liking’ dimension. As we have
some hint of in the previous experiment, the intrinsic artistic merit of the painting
may have an interactive effect with how we interpret any emotions we are having
at the same time as viewing it. For example, an artwork that we would normally
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deem good might make us more receptive to a wider range of emotional responses
while looking at it. Contrarily, if paintings that are liked are those that generally
entail positive affective responses, we may find that disgust hampers the most liked
paintings in the group. ‘Liking’ is the most subjective question in the set, and as
such it is the most cognitively ‘hidden’: it does not allow us to ascertain what kind
of aesthetic experience the viewer is having: is the high rating because the painting
is exquisitely beautiful, or haunting, or skillful, or intellectually engaging? Is the
appreciation more cognitive, or is it more heady and hedonic? Nonetheless, there
may be some interesting patterns at this most general level of evaluation.
We asked subjects to rate interest, because there has been some suggestion that
these effects are about, in some ways, learning: new information is inherently stimu-
lating and cognitively rewarding. ‘Novelty’ was also included as a dimension meant
to get at this idea. Perhaps the mere presence of anything incongruous or convention-
shattering would be enough to enhance responsiveness to disgust.
We asked subjects how funny the artwork was in part because we were trying
to see whether there would be any connections between this finding and the earlier
finding with humor: could the positive priming effect be explained purely through
the perceived humor on the canvas, or was enjoyment deriving from other qualities?
We measured how disgusting the paintings were, to get a sense of whether the
level of disgust people felt already while viewing the image would have an influence
on the way an incidental burst of that same emotion would be used. It’s also possible
that paintings which are disturbing or unsettling more generally could better explain
when these priming effects are most effective. So we measured disturbingness, to dis-
ambiguate from disgust specifically. Finally, we asked subjects to rate offensiveness,
as moral disgust could influence the use of a disgust prime, even in the absence of
any physically disgusting cues.
To view the overall results of this study, see Table 3.1.
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Table 3.1: Questions asked in the art norming studies, and mean value for all paintings
in the study (standard deviation in parentheses). No value indicates the question was
not asked for that type of art.
Question Abstract Landscape Grotesque
How much do you like this artwork? 3.32 (1.66) 3.90 (1.55) 2.71 (1.64)
How interesting is this artwork? 3.61 (1.59) 3.88 (1.44) 3.39 (1.62)
How novel is this artwork? 3.19 (1.44) 3.25 (1.54)
How calming is this artwork? 2.78 (1.51) 3.86 (1.44)
How complex is this artwork? 3.59 (1.55) 3.98 (1.36)
How pleasant is this artwork? 3.08 (1.50) 3.91 (1.43)
How familiar is this artwork? 2.53 (1.57) 2.93 (1.63)
How disturbing is this artwork? 2.33 (1.57) 3.14 (1.78)
How funny is this artwork? 2.19 (1.57)
How disgusting is this artwork? 2.73 (1.77)
How offensive is this artwork? 2.38 (1.69)
3.3.2.2 Abstract norming
118 American subjects completed the study; Mdn age = 28, 57% female, from 35
states. The study took about one hour to complete.
Participants rated 60 abstract paintings, the same the originally appeared in ear-
lier studies. Because of the relatively modest number of paintings to be ranked, each
subject viewed all 60 paintings and rated them on all dimensions. The paintings were
presented in between-subjects randomized order, with a fixed order of eight questions
meant to draw out candidate important dimensions for predicting what was under-
lying the effect. The questions were on a 6-point scale, with anchors “Not at all” (1)
and “Very” (2) (“Very much” for the Liking question). All questions would be asked
of the artwork before advancing to the next painting. These questions were slightly
different as those used in the grotesque art survey; see Table 3.1.
These norming data were then applied to the second abstract priming study (the
one appearing in Section 3.2). Although the experimental data comes from a different
population than the norming data, we were nonetheless hoping that some preliminary
patterns might be observable here. The only finding of note in here was that including
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familiarity of the painting as a predictor increased not only the main effect of emotion
effect on liking, but yielded a significant interaction effect between these two. Using a
linear mixed effects model treating subject and painting as random effects, the main
effect of the emotion condition was more reliable than the original model (t = 2.50,
p = .01), and the interaction effect was significant, such that the more familiar the
painting was, the stronger the disgust priming effect (t = 2.26, p = .02). There is no
obvious reason for the direction of the observed effect (if anything, one might have
predicted the opposite, that less familiar work would have made greater use of the
disgust prime).
3.3.2.3 Landscape norming
119 American subjects completed the study; they had a median age of 29, were
65% female, and represented 32 states.
The design of the landscape norming study was the same as that of abstract
norming study, except there was no question about novelty or disturbingness. For a
full list of questions and the results, see Table 3.1.
The norming data were applied to the landscape painting condition in the previous
priming study, but no discernible patterns between the prime condition by painting
and ratings on any of the norming dimensions was found.
3.4 The use of disgust in grotesque art judgments
The chief goal of this experiment was to use the norming data to select a reasonably
well-controlled group of grotesque art and see how disgust influenced our experience
of it, and to see whether any interesting patterns emerged depending on some of the
qualities of that art.
A subsidiary goal of this study was to address a paradox in how disgust influences
evaluative judgment: how is it that disgust can enhance liking of art, whilst disgust
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at the same time appears to fuel moral furor over art in many cases (especially
art containing some sort of purity violation: the violent, sexualized, or profane).
To answer this question, this study asked subjects to evaluate paintings differently,
depending on the question. Some were asked to respond how much they liked the
painting, while others were asked to evaluate how offensive the painting was. A third
group were asked to rate how pretty the painting was. We predicted that disgust
would aid liking of the painting, but that disgust would also lead to higher judgments
of offensiveness. The inclusion of the prettiness condition was intended to allow us to
separate out what is going on with the liking effect: is disgust making the painting
seem more appealing at a simple sensory level? Or is it deepening appreciation
unrelated to mere prettiness?
3.4.1 Methods
724 subjects participated in this online study for a small cash payment. 68% were
female, and they had a median age of 30.
The norming data collected on the grotesque art was used to select a subset of
paintings to be included in a disgust priming study with grotesque art. 60 paintings of
the normed 445 were selected: the 12 most liked, the 12 least liked, the 12 funniest,
the 12 most disgusting, and the 12 least disgusting. In the case that a painting
appeared on more than one list, it was put on the list it fit with best, and the next
best candidate was selected for the other category.7 Representative examples of high
and low disgust grotesque art are presented in in Figure 3.6.
The previous art experiments used an interleaved design; that is, the emotion
prime (a scrambled sentence) was placed between each aesthetic judgment. This is not
a traditional design for emotion induction experiments, which tend to have a unified
7Several of the dimensions bleed into one another. For example, the most disgusting art also
tended to end up on the most disliked list. We did not control for all of these properties in the
selected paintings.
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Jenny Saville, Matrix (1999) Salvador Dali, The Persistence of Memory
(1931)
Francisco Goya, Saturn Devouring His Son
(c. 1819–1823)
Pieter Bruegel the Elder, Portrait of an Old
Woman (1563)
Figure 3.6: At left, two of the more disgusting artworks from the corpus, which
were used in the grotesque priming experiment. At right, two of the least disgusting
paintings.
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mood induction stage followed by a unified judgment stage. The rationale behind
such a design is that individual judgments are less likely to contaminate one another
(perhaps falsely potentiating or carrying over judgments from one trial to another),
and also to minimize the chance that subjects will discern the intent of the study.
We wanted some assurance that our results would also obtain in a more traditional
emotion induction paradigm, so the present study had a short mood induction portion
(unscrambling ten sentences) followed by a single judgment task (of one painting).
An advantage of this design is it allows for a more plausible cover story: the
experiment was presented as two studies by two different researchers. In the first
‘study’, participants unjumbled a random selection of ten scrambled sentences, either
all disgusting or all neutral (the emotion condition was between-subjects) as selected
from the larger pool of 80 sentences that has been used in the previous studies. In the
‘study’ immediately following, participants were instructed to rate a picture, which
was one of the 60 paintings that had been selected from the corpus. Along the bottom
of the image appeared one of three questions: ‘How much do you like this painting’,
‘How offensive do you find this painting’, or ‘How pretty is this painting?’ Subjects
rated this question on a scale of 1 (‘Not at all’) to 6 (‘Very’ or ‘Very much’).
A major disadvantage of this design is we are only taking one measure per partic-
ipant. So even though the design is ‘cleaner’ in some senses, it is also substantially
lower powered. The larger number of subjects was intended to counteract this issue
(particularly as we were interested in eventually comparing effects between the five
different painting type conditions).
Afterwards, subjects were given some demographics and individual differences

































Figure 3.7: The influence of disgust on all types of grotesque art (including art rated
as high and low in likability, and high and low in disgust). The emotion contrast is
nearing significance in the ‘Liking’ question (p = .12), but not for the other questions.
3.4.2 Results
A general trend appeared for all of the grotesque art to be liked more in the
disgust condition (M disgust = 2.62, M neutral = 2.35, t = 1.55, p = .12). The two other
questions were not nearing significance; see Figure 3.7).
When these data are subsetted by the intrinsic disgust of the painting, an in-
teresting pattern emerges: subjects who saw high disgust images were more likely
to find the image offensive in the disgust condition (see Figure 3.8). Conversely,
they were less likely to say that the painting was offensive in the disgust condition
for non-disgusting paintings (t = 1.95, p = .05). It is not surprising that the non-
disgusting paintings did not seem more offensive in the disgust condition, since there
was not much to be offended by ; however, it is unexpected that disgust would lower
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offensiveness.
The non-disgusting paintings were also considered less pretty when subjects had
been exposed to disgust (t = 2.98, p = .006; see Figure 3.8). There is no coherent
pattern for the disgusting paintings. Presumably this is due to a floor effect: the
disgusting grotesque paintings weren’t pretty to begin with (rated an average of 1.4
on a scale that only goes down to 1 in a neutral state). There is just not much
wiggle room for finding superficial charm in spreadeagled transsexuals and filicidal
cannibal-gods.
No coherent effects between painting types emerged when the strongly liked and
strongly disliked paintings were compared. It therefore seems that the extant disgust
content of a painting is a better predictor of whether the disgust prime will influence
aesthetic judgment than overall liking.
3.5 Discussion
In this chapter, we demonstrated that disgust has no clear negative impact on
aesthetic judgments, and in fact in some cases, appears to have a salutary effect.
This finding goes against commonly held assumptions about how disgust (and nega-
tive affect more generally) weighs in on evaluative judgment, and represent the first
demonstration that incidental disgust can increase liking for art.
How disgust influences aesthetic judgment depends on the type of art under con-
sideration. Disgust enhances our enjoyment of abstract art, but not landscapes.
Grotesque art also tended to be enjoyed more in our disgust condition, though this
effect was not statistically significant. This is consistent with view that feeling states
are incorporated into judgments only to the extent that they can be made sense of
in relation to that judgment (Schwarz, 2012).
In a similar vein, disgust’s influence varies depending on the question it is being
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High disgust grotesque paintings
Figure 3.8: Disgust priming on two different types of grotesque paintings. Contrasts
are significant in the offensiveness condition for both sets of paintings, and significant
for the prettiness condition for the low disgust paintings. The contrast is trending for
liking for both sets of paintings.
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how much we like it, but when we see the art as potentially offensive, or are trying
to determine how pretty it is, disgust can have the opposite effect. These effects
are themselves qualified by the objects under consideration: for example, disgust
increases the offensiveness of already disgusting paintings, but not paintings low in
disgust.
These studies, while intriguing, are accompanied by several unexpected findings
and limitations. First, we failed to uncover any clear differences in how disgust
influences liking of different genres of art. While the effect of the disgust primes
on judgments of landscape art were not significant, they were also not significantly
different from the abstract art judgments. Likewise, liking of grotesque art, while
trending in the predicted direction in the disgust condition, was not reliable enough
to reach significance. These null and marginal results seem to reflect an overall
weakness in the primes at eliciting an effect on behavior, although for the grotesque
art experiment this may have also reflected the lower-powered design (consisting of a
single trial for each subject, rather than a few dozen).
Given the low means and relatively higher standard deviations for ratings of
the abstract and grotesque art, individual differences may be playing a large role
in how disgust is interpreted during aesthetic experiences. Unfortunately, these stud-
ies did not measure pre-existing artistic preferences, so we are lent no perspective
onto whether this would have made a difference in the efficacy of the disgust primes.
Future work should place an emphasis on the between-subjects factors that go into
the hedonic disgust response.
As with studies in Chapter II, the nature of the emotion induction stimuli limits
the generality of the conclusions we can draw about how disgust influences judgment.
While the disgust sentences are more disgusting than the neutral sentences, they also
differ on a few other dimensions, such as emotional intensity and interestingness.
Furthermore, their highly abstract nature makes it harder to know whether affec-
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tive valence is driving their influence on judgment. In the next chapter, we explore





In the preceding chapters, we looked at how disgust influences evaluations using
a particular kind of prime: scrambled sentences. While this method has been used
successfully by other investigators (Schnall, Benton, & Harvey, 2008; Costin, 1969;
Srull & Wyer, 1979), it is not without its limitations.
One reservation we might have is that these sentences are not emotional enough.
While our pretests indicate that subjects are more likely to report that sentences
in the disgust condition elicit disgust than an emotionally neutral state (§ 2.1.2),
the amount of disgust these sentences arouse was not measured. Even assuming
that these sentences succeed at eliciting a reasonable amount of disgust by some
standard, their overtly conceptual nature leaves open the possibility that our results
are due to semantic, rather than emotional, priming. Admittedly, here is an ill-
defined boundary here, since full-fledged emotions have semantic content, and priming
of specific emotions (as opposed to moods or affective states) relies on activating
cognitive appraisals (“I am in danger”, “this person wronged me”, et cetera; Ellsworth
& Scherer, 2003; Lerner & Keltner, 2000). But it is not inconceivable that these
sentences activate a variety of semantic networks, only some of which are associated
with emotional appraisals—perhaps the non-emotional semantic activations are solely
responsible for the observed changes to downstream judgments. Even if we eliminated
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that possibility, we would still want to know whether it is only the semantic or
conceptual aspects of disgust that are amenable to hedonic reversals, or whether
its affective and somatic dimensions also play a role.
A related concern is the scrambled sentences represent a version of disgust that
is both mild and relatively abstracted. Subjects are not being presented with a
disgusting object, but rather a verbal description of one, which lacks any of the sensory
properties of the object it describes. The state induced by disgusting sentences,
therefore, may be circumscribed in a way that does not align with the emotion as it
is usually encountered in the real world. In the Introduction, we suggested that there
may be an upper threshold for negative sensation in benign masochistic behavior, after
which the activity is no longer pleasurable. Others have made a similar suggestion,
that the negative sensation needs to occur in a safe context in order to be pleasurable
(Bloom, 2010; Apter, 1982; Rozin, Guillot, et al., 2010). Perhaps hedonic reversals
can only be achieved when the emotion has been watered down, or we have obtained
the proper psychological distance from it. Using stronger, more realistic emotion
primes would allow us to observe how hedonic disgust withstands a higher level of
emotional intensity, negativity, and immediacy.
Finally, an overarching goal of this line of research is to determine what it is about
disgust that allows it to have a positive hedonic impact. Earlier we demonstrated that
sadness primes can also make humor funnier (§ 2.1), but this finding leaves many
questions unanswered: is this due to some shared property of sadness and disgust—
such as negative valence, arousal level, or interestingness? Or is their convergent effect
on humor the result of two different cognitive mechanisms? One way to approach such
questions is to look at the range of disgust stimuli that elicit hedonic reversals, and
for which judgments.
Thus, we turn our attention to two novel strategies for inducing disgust: olfactory
cues (an aversive odor) and visual/tactile cues (a dirty environment). These disgust
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primes have have no overt semantic content, they are relatively strong, they are not
hypothetical or abstracted, and they are ecologically valid. They therefore have the
potential to address all or most of the concerns raised above.1
Such emotion induction methods are new to the field, but not untested. Research
has shown that disgust-related states driven by environmental and somatic informa-
tion influence behavior much the same way as more conceptual or indirect manip-
ulations (which would include reading words, viewing faces and other imagery, and
memory and imagination-based exercises). For example, hand-washing makes moral
judgment more severe (Zhong et al., 2010), and recalling past misdeeds increases the
desire to clean one’s hands (Zhong & Liljenquist, 2006). The overall cleanliness of an
environment can also impact moral judgment, with dirty rooms increasing the sever-
ity of moral judgments, and cleaning behavior reversing this effect (Schnall, Haidt,
et al., 2008; Schnall, Benton, & Harvey, 2008). Odors can also alter behavior: fresh
scents promote cleaning behavior (Holland, Hendriks, & Aarts, 2005) and virtuous
acts (Liljenquist, Zhong, & Galinsky, 2010), and disgusting smells can make moral
pronouncements harsher (Schnall, Haidt, et al., 2008; Inbar et al., 2012). Most of the
work using these manipulations has focused on their relation to emotion-congruent
moral commitments (although see Lee & Schwarz, 2010; Xu, Zwick, & Schwarz, 2012);
whether such manipulations can lead to increased enjoyment has not been tested.
Another limitation of previous studies that we hope to redress here is the narrow
band of judgment stimuli. Our humor stimuli in the past have been limited to single-
panel New Yorker cartoons and moral vignettes; ideally we would expect to see the
disgust enhancement effect across all potentially humorous stimuli. Previous studies
failed to find a difference between the effect of disgust on clean and dirty humor.
1This was not our only experimentation with other modes of disgust induction, though it was our
only successful one. We also ran an online study manipulating disgust by having subjects recall a
disgusting experience. Activating memories of past disgusting experiences failed to affect subsequent
judgment of cartoons compared to recall of sad or emotionally neutral experiences. These results
are reported in Appendix C.
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This runs somewhat counter to feelings-as-information theory (Schwarz, 2012), which
would predict that, since disgust is especially apt during the delivery of a dirty joke,
disgust should have a larger effect on judgments of dirty jokes. This study gives us
another opportunity to see whether any differences in humor type emerge in disgust’s
efficacy at enhancing funniness.
In Chapter III, we looked at how disgust influences judgments of paintings. For
this study, we turned our attention to another cultural phenomenon that makes use of
disgust: adventurous eating shows. In these programs, people are depicted consuming
delicacies such as crickets and bull testicles. While these shows ostensibly have an
educational component, part of their entertainment value appears to derive from
trading on the alluring, shocking, and rubbernecking qualities of disgust. Whether
this emotion actually contributes to our enjoyment of such programming has never
been tested.
Thus, the present study focuses on two hedonic disgust experiences, humor and
adventurous eating. Embodied disgust was induced in subjects by placing them
in either an unkempt or smelly room while watching these shows. We predicted
that stand-up comedy and adventurous eating shows would be more enjoyable in the
disgusting rooms.
4.1 Methods
Four types of video clip were prepared. Clean and dirty humor stimuli were
excerpted from full-length stand-up comedy acts from several well-known comedians.
The clean humor videos came from Jerry Seinfeld, Demetri Martin, Mitch Hedberg,
and David Cross. The dirty humor videos came from Bob Sagat, Chris Rock, Sarah
Silverman, Nick Swardson, and David Cross. The content of these videos was screened
to ensure that they contained dirty topics, primarily sexual or scatalogical in nature
(for the dirty videos) or that they had no dirty, taboo, or aggressive content (for the
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clean videos). Because of disgust’s strong ties to gustation, any bits related to food
or eating were excluded from the stimulus set for both sets of humor videos.2
A number of adventurous eating shows have cropped up over the past few years;
the video clips in the present study were excerpted from episodes of Bizarre Foods
with Andrew Zimmern. In this show, the host travels the world, eating food that
most Westerners would consider inedible (eyeballs, penises, and all manner of crunchy
insects). As a control, we included a fourth video type, one that should be enjoyed
less when feeling disgusted: traditional cooking shows. This would serve as our
manipulation check, much the same as the manipulation check that was used for the
scrambled sentences (§ 2.1.3) The traditional cooking videos were excerpted from the
show Good Eats, which features a host cooking a variety of sweet and savory meals.
Fourteen video clips in each category were created. All clips were trimmed to be
approximately three minutes long.
Three rooms were prepared for subject running, representing each of three between-
subject emotion manipulations. One room was a normal testing space, a small room
with two fairly new computers on a desk and no extraneous clutter or detritus on
the desk or surrounding area. The room was the same as that used in the other
laboratory experiments reported in previous chapters: it was not exceptionally or
conspicuously clean, just not in any way noticeably dirty. The second room was vir-
tually the same as the first, but a novelty fart spray (brand name: Liquid Ass) was
spritzed into an open plastic baggie and put into the trash bin under the computer
desk during subject running. The odor of the spray could be described as a mixture
of sulphur, manure, and halitosis. One spritz of fart spray was put onto a paper
towel in the ziplock baggie approximately every other subject. The recency of the
odor replenishment was recorded, and the old baggie was sealed before a new baggie
2This is also true of the New Yorker cartoons selected for the priming studies described in
Chapter II.
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would be prepared. The trashcan was emptied at the end of the day.3 This method
ensured the smell would be noticeable, but not so bad that it would be noteworthy
or unbearable.4 The room was otherwise equivalently clean to the first testing room.
For the physical dirtiness condition, a computer was set up in a room containing
a large, old-fashioned soundproof booth. Although the computer and monitor were
the same as that used the other rooms, the white keyboard and mouse (which the
subject had to touch) were older, yellowed and grungy. Sugar water was dribbled
over the desk and metal floor, leaving it shiny and tacky.5 Some older lab items, such
as a pair of headphones whose orange foam had dried and begun to crumble off, were
placed at the far end of the desk, not close but within view. A few drops of non-dairy
creamer were splashed onto the seat of an old fabric chair where the subject was to
be seated, giving the appearance of a bodily fluid of unknown provenance. A couple
of crumbled tissues were strewn on the ground, near the trash can. These were only
visual and tactile cues to dirtiness in the room, which was odorless.6 See Figure 4.1
for images of the dirty room.
150 American, native English-speaking University of Michigan students (62% fe-
male, M age = 18.7) participated in the experiment for course credit. They were told
the experiment was about personality and television preferences. In a 3 x 2 x 2
between-subjects experimental design, participants were placed in the clean, dirty, or
smelly room and then shown a video program that was either food-related or humor-
related, containing either hedonic disgust content or not. Room type and video type
3This method was taken from D. Pizarro (personal communication). This method is identical to
that used in, e.g. Inbar et al., 2012.
4Interestingly, no participants remarked upon the odor of the room to the experimenters. My
own subjective experience sitting at the computer in this room was that a mild but unmistakable
odor would waft up every now and again over the course of the hour. It was not a strong, persistent
odor, or an odor to which one quickly acclimated.
5Note to D. Meyer, who generously allowed me to defile his lab space in this way: this room has
since been cleaned.
6A small number of subjects remarked upon how the testing room seemed run-down or even
creepy: it was evident that this room was not as nice as the main lab space, where they had met
their experimenter and signed their consent forms. Not enough subjects remarked upon the dirtiness
of the room for us to determined whether this awareness had any measurable effect on responses.
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A view of the testing room as one entered The trashcan next to the computer desk
Detail of the keyboard The testing room floor. Note the shiny, discol-
ored appearance.
Figure 4.1: The room used in the dirty room condition of the embodied disgust study.
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were counterbalanced. The experimental software, E-Prime, turned out to be ill-
suited to the task of showing videos, and would sometimes crash partway through
the experiment. The video clip, video condition, or computer used at the time of the
crash appeared to be random (that is, certain conditions were not more likely to ex-
perience the malfunction than others). 20 subjects did not complete the experiment
for this reason, leaving a total of 130 subjects for whom complete data was obtained
(and analyzed).
Each participant viewed fourteen video clips, each of which were approximately
three minutes long. At the conclusion of each clip, participants would rate the video
on a scale of 1–6, for how much they liked it. A rating of ‘1’ signified they did not like
the clip “at all”, and a rating of ‘6’ indicated that they liked the clip “very much”.
The order of the video clips was randomized between subjects.
After the video ratings were complete, participants completed an online survey,
which included basic demographic questions and individual differences surveys, in-
cluding Rozin’s Benign Masochism scale (Rozin, Guillot, et al., 2010), the Openness
subscale of the Big Five Inventory (John & Srivastava, 1999) and the Obsessional
Impulses to Harm Self/Others Subscale of the Padua Inventory (Burns, Keortge,
Formea, & Sternberger, 1996). The benign masochism scale is a list of 30 benign
masochistic activities, which are rated for how much they are enjoyed. The scale
includes some disgust-related items, such as gory movies, medical exhibits, and dirty
jokes. Openness to experience (whose subscales relate to imagination, artistic inter-
ests, emotionality, and adventurousness) on Big Five personality scales correlates with
aesthetic chills while listening to music, particularly sad music, although openness
has not been directly tested as a predictor of benign masochism enjoyment (McCrae,
2007).7 The Padua Inventory was included to see whether desire to cause genuine
harm to the self—non-benign masochism—predicts harmless hedonic reversals (those
7Excitement-seeking—a dimension of the extroversion factor—may have also been relevant,
though this was not tested.
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which simulate, in some sense, actual harming of the self). After administering these
scales, we asked subjects whether they noticed the odor in the room, and if so what
it was. The experiment lasted approximately 60 minutes.
After the first 150 subjects were run, the data were analyzed, at which point it
was discovered that the disgust manipulations were having a null effect on judgments
in the humor condition (see below). We wanted to eliminate the possibility that
this failure was due to using a different question as previous studies (we were asking
subjects to report how much they liked the humor stimuli, whereas in the past we had
asked them how funny they were). Thus, another 99 subjects (20 dropped because of
computer crashing) were run in the humor conditions with the new question phrasing
(“How funny did you find that clip?” instead of “How much did you like that clip?”).
4.2 Results
4.2.1 Effects of experimental condition
The overall results for the first 130 subjects who had complete data are given in
Figure 4.2. Physical and olfactory disgust stimuli had the predicted effect on food-
related programming. People liked the cooking shows less when they viewed them
in a dirty or smelly room (M neutral = 4.10, M dirty = 3.68, M smelly = 3.69), but they
enjoyed the adventurous eating shows more when in these rooms (M neutral = 2.36,
M dirty = 3.48, M smelly = 3.37). Given that both disgust manipulations appeared to
have comparable effects on judgments, we set contrasts in a linear mixed effects model
so that the disgust manipulations were in one group, and the neutral condition (the
clean room) was in the other. Emotion manipulation, video type, and trial number
were set as fixed effects, and video clip and subject were set as random effects.8
8For all models described here, trial was included as a predictor. Trial often had a significant
main effect, in the direction of the ratings going down as the experiment wore on. No interaction
effects for trial (e.g. with room type) were ever found.
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Figure 4.2: The influence of two forms of embodied disgust—odor and room
dirtiness—on enjoyment of traditional cooking shows, adventurous eating shows, and
dirty and clean stand-up comedy.
This model revealed a significant interaction between food show type (cooking or
adventurous) and emotion manipulation (neutral or disgust), N = 64, t = 2.27, p =
.008. There was no main effect of show type on liking (t = .51, p = .34).
An analogous model was constructed for the 66 subjects in the two humor condi-
tions. There was an overall preference for the clean stand-up comedy (t = 1.76, p =
.05), but no main effect of emotion manipulation (disgust conditions vs. neutral), or
significant interaction between show type (dirty humor vs. clean humor) and emotion
manipulation (t = .06, p = .96). Although there appears to be an overall trend for
the two disgust conditions to harm ratings of the dirty stand-up comedy, this effect
is not significant (t = .19, p = .83).
The ineffectiveness of the odor and dirtiness manipulations at evincing a change
in humor judgment—either for better or worse—is inconsistent with both our pre-
dictions and the predictions of traditional congruency-based emotion theories. Since
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Figure 4.3: The (null) results for the second version of the experiment, where subjects
rated the funniness, rather than likability, of stand-up comedy.
our previous studies had indicated that disgust enhances humor when subjects are
asked to evaluate funniness (§§ 2.1, 2.2) and the way disgust is incorporated into a
judgment is contingent on the question asked (§ 3.4), we ran subjects in a second
version of the study, where subjects were asked to report the stand-up comedy’s fun-
niness, rather how much they liked it. Although these questions should yield highly
overlapping judgments for most comedic stimuli, it is possible to imagine the two
sometimes diverging, as when finding something amusing while also recognizing its
overall unfortunateness or offensiveness.
The results of this modified version of the experiment are presented in Figure 4.3.
Changing the evaluation from one of ‘liking’ to one of ‘funniness’ made no appreciable
difference in how disgust impacted, or failed to impact, judgments. In a linear mixed-
effects model setting room condition, video type, and trial as fixed effects, with video
clip and subject as random factors, no significant effects emerged (N = 79, all p =
n.s.).
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4.2.2 Effects of odor liminality
Odor, while designed to be kept relatively constant from subject to subject, was
not always reported as noticeable in the smelly room: only 26% of subjects reported
smelling anything in the smelly room (0% of subjects reported smelling anything in
the clean or dirty rooms). When asked to identify the smell, subjects reported a
range of candidates: rotten eggs, cow dung, staleness, mustiness, old food, sweat, dog
poop, “the odor of animals at the zoo”, sardines, flatulence, “old people smell”. Some
declined to give a specific guess, but identified the smell as unpleasant (“I’m not sure
but it smelled bad”). While there was a wide range of interpretations as to the exact
nature of the odor, the smells were always identified as unpleasant, and almost all of
the guesses were disgust-related.
It’s not clear whether we should expect awareness to impact performance in the
smelly room condition. Schnall, Haidt, et al., 2008 found that the strength of a nov-
elty fart spray dispersed into a room (which correlated with likelihood that subjects
noticed the smell) did not predict the strength of the effect: the mere presence of
the odor was all that mattered. Studies using aversive odors (including fart spray)
to influence attitudes towards homosexuals and suspicion (Inbar et al., 2012; Lee
& Schwarz, 2011) found that whether subjects noticed the smell did not mediate
the observed effects (Inbar, personal communication; Lee, personal communication).
Studies where the disgust-related odor was designed to be largely or wholly subliminal
find such primes to be effective: for the ‘clean scent’ placed in the room in Holland et
al., 2005, virtually all subjects were unaware of the aroma when queried afterwards
(there were too few subjects who did notice the scent to draw any conclusions about
whether supraliminality would have differentially affected the results).
Some research has uncovered cases where unconscious olfactory cues are more ef-
fective at changing behavior than conscious ones (Li, Moallem, Paller, & Gottfried,
2007). This is not unlike priming effects in other domains, where subliminal primes
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can be more effective (e.g. Murphy & Zajonc, 1993; Jacoby & Whitehouse, 1989),
especially if the supraliminal condition is one where the subject is motivated to ‘cor-
rect’ for it (Kelley, 1973; Schwarz & Clore, 1983, 2007). If unconscious olfactory cues
are more effective simply because they cannot be intercepted, then we would expect
consciously experienced stimuli to be equally discounted across all types of judgment.
But additional factors may play a part in determining the efficacy of a subliminal
or supraliminal prime, including the domain-specific relevance of liminality. Perhaps
overt disgust signals are apt, even necessary, for gustation-related judgments, whereas
hedonic disgust requires a lighter touch. To test this possibility, we divided subjects
in the smelly room condition into those who could smell the odor, and those who did
not.
The sub- and supraliminal odor subjects were compared to those in the neutral
(clean, odor-free room) condition. This data is represented in Figure 4.4.
A disgusting odor decreased enjoyment of cooking shows, but only when that odor
was noticeable (contrasting the supraliminal condition to the other two conditions,
N = 48, t = 2.24, p = .003). Overall, the subliminal and clean room conditions
led to nearly identical cooking show ratings (M neutral = 3.76, M subliminal = 3.76,
M supraliminal = 3.04).
We found the opposite effect for adventurous eating shows, with subliminal cues
leading to higher ratings than consciously perceiving the odor, or there being no odor
(contrasting the subliminal condition to the other two conditions, N = 51, t = 2.26,
p = .002). Interestingly, conscious awareness of the smell did not harm ratings of
the adventurous eating shows compared to the neutral condition (M neutral = 2.46,
M subliminal = 3.21, M supraliminal = 2.39).
Dividing the odor by liminality yielded no significant effects for either clean or
dirty stand-up comedy. This null finding held whether considering the first version
(‘liking’ question) or the second version (‘funniness’ question) of the experiment.
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Figure 4.4: The influence of awareness of a disgusting odor on enjoyment of traditional
cooking shows, adventurous eating shows, and dirty and clean stand-up comedy.
There were no significant interaction effects between the question asked and the odor
conditions on ratings; the data depicted in Figure 4.4 collapses the data from both
study versions.
4.2.3 Individual differences
For food shows, degree of priming effect was not mediated by the sex of the
participant (t = 1.02, p = .31). Partialling out sex did not bring out any priming
effect for the humor shows (t = .18, p = .60 for differences in the emotion prime means
when sex is included in the model; t = 1.31, p = .16 for the interaction between sex
and emotion manipulation). However, there was a main effect of enjoyment of these
shows by sex: men enjoyed the adventurous eating shows more (Mmale = 3.77,M female
= 3.39, t = 2.63, p = .009) and dirty comedy routines more (Mmale = 3.70, M female
= 2.67, t = 6.10, p <.0001). Women enjoyed the clean comedy routines more than
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men did (Mmale = 3.67, M female = 4.09, t = 2.54, p = .01). No clear preference
for the cooking shows emerged (Mmale = 3.76, M female = 4.01, t = 1.51, p = .13)
These findings mirror those found in §2.1.5, in that males and females are equally
susceptible to hedonic disgust primes, even as they display differing baseline levels
of enjoyment for these activities. One interpretation of these results is that hedonic
disgust is not what determines the disjunction in gender preferences for these sources
of entertainment in the first place.
Subjects completed three individual differences surveys at the end of the experi-
ment, included to test for whether any of these factors would predict the efficacy of
the emotion prime.
The first among these was the Benign Masochism scale (Rozin, Guillot, et al.,
2010), a survey that measures enjoyment of a variety of hedonic reversals. Subjects
rate items on a sliding scale from 0 to 100 (“Not at all” – “As much as I like anything”),
with a “Not Applicable” option if they have not experienced it. The scale consists
of 29 items representing several subtypes of benign masochistic experience, including
those related to sadness, pain, fear, and disgust (see Table 4.1 for a list of all items).
The items on the benign masochism scale appeared in randomized order between
participants.
The original paper describing the scale found that score on any one item positively
predicts the score on the other items, and that the items correspond to coherent
emotion-based factors, with the exception of the disgust-related items (Rozin, Guillot,
et al., 2010). This may be due to the fact that two items on the disgust subscale
(pinching pimples and nose picking) are recreations that only arouse disgust in others;
if anything, these are behaviors rooted in grooming and hygiene. The hedonic disgust
subscale might be best represented by disgusting jokes, disgusting museum exhibits,
and gory movies, since these are the items most related to wallowing in the sensation
of disgust.
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There are a few other items on this scale that relate to disgust. Two are related
to oral bitterness (black coffee, bitter vegetables). Taste bud receptors for bitterness
are believed to have evolved to sense toxins, whereas disgust is more closely related to
avoidance of pathogens (Glendinning, 1994; Rozin & Fallon, 1987; Rozin et al., 1999).
For this reason “distaste” is considered a separate entity from disgust, although the
two may have become entangled over time (Berridge, 2000; Kelly, 2011). Thus, we
may not want to consider hedonic disgust and hedonic bitterness (distaste) equivalent
sorts of experience.
The other disgust-related item is “stinky cheese”. The odor of cheese, when not
put in context, is undeniably vile: in an unmarked container, the smell of parmesan
is indistinguishable from vomit (Herz & von Clef, 2001). In spite of its sensory
properties, there is no evidence that those who enjoy strong cheese actually experience
it as disgusting. By contrast, when faced with a dirty joke, people report that they
both disgusted and amused (Hemenover & Schimmack, 2007). The question of how
much these contextual shifts change the activation of disgust is a question taken up
in more detail in §5.3.
The exclusion of any sexual items on the original scale is somewhat surprising,
especially considering that the term “masochism” in everyday language is principally
used to describe sexual activity. We added an item to correct for this omission: “Mild
pain in a sexual context (such as spanking or hair pulling).” Note that the wording
specifies that the masochism in question was benign, consistent with the other items
on the scale. This rounded the total number of items out to 30. This is the first
research to make use of the scale outside of the paper in which it was developed.
A linear mixed-effects model for each of the TV show conditions fit to the spec-
ifications above (emotion manipulation and trial as fixed factors, with movie item
and subject as random factors) was augmented to include Benign Masochism scale
as a fixed factor. Under this set of models, a high benign masochism score positively
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Table 4.1: Items and scores from the Benign Masochism Scale. Higher score indicates
greater enjoyment. % NA is percentage of respondents who report never having had
the experience. Hedonic disgust items highlighted in gray.
Item Mean (SD) % NA
Thrill rides in amusement parks 76.4 (28.4 ) 1.2
The feeling of exerting yourself physically (for
example starting to sweat, your heart pounding,
etc.)
65.0 (28.9 ) 0.0
Massages which produce some pain 52.9 (31.5 ) 4.3
The feeling of being physically exhausted, after
extended effort
52.1 (32.4 ) 0.0
Spicy foods 50.9 (32.6 ) 0.0
Sad music 48.9 (29.4 ) 0.3
Sad movies 46.7 (28.1 ) 0.3
Tacos with hot sauce 45.5 (35.6 ) 2.2
Frightening movies 42.8 (32.3 ) 0.0
The taste of beer 41.9 (31.3 ) 7.1
Sad novels 41.6 (30.1 ) 0.9
The pounding in your heart in response to fright-
ening experiences or movies
40.8 (30.4 ) 0.3
Mild pain in a sexual context (such as spanking or
hair pulling)
37.1 (32.6 ) 12.3
Disgusting jokes 36.8 (29.8 ) 0.3
The burn you feel in your mouth when eating spicy
foods
32.5 (29.9 ) 0.6
Anger directed at a fictional character in a novel
or movie
31.8 (25.9 ) 1.2
Pinching pimples 29.9 (29.7 ) 0.0
Gory movies 28.8 (29.2 ) 0.3
Sad paintings 28.8 (27.5 ) 4.3
Disgusting experiences (like a medical exhibit with
real body fluids and parts)
28.3 (30.4 ) 1.9
Unsweetened coffee 24.4 (32.0 ) 5.9
Flashes of hot pain (like the first few seconds
when entering a too hot bath)
24.1 (26.2 ) 0.3
Your eyes tearing up when eating spicy foods 21.4 (25.2 ) 1.9
The taste of scotch 20.4 (24.9 ) 23.1
Crying in response to sad art 18.4 (24.5 ) 12.0
Flashes of cold pain (like the first few seconds
when entering a too cold shower or the ocean)
17.1 (21.7 ) 0.6
Picking your nose 16.6 (21.9 ) 2.2
Sweating when eating spicy foods 16.5 (22.1 ) 3.1
Stinky cheese 15.3 (24.8 ) 3.4
Bitter vegetables (such as radicchio, escarole,
radishes)
15.0 (21.6 ) 4.0
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predicted liking for the adventurous eating shows (t = 3.59, p = .0001), and was
trending in the direction for predicting dislike of traditional cooking shows, but this
effect was not significant (t = 1.03, p = .11). It also marginally predicted liking both
humor shows more (t = 1.90, p = .06), with a significant interaction between type
of humor, demonstrating that people with high benign masochism scores like dirty
humor especially (t = 1.92, p = .02). These main effects are consistent with the idea
that dirty humor and adventurous eating are reflections of the broader phenomenon
of benign masochism, and show that this scale reliably reflects preferences for actual
experiences.
Furthermore, we found that the overall benign masochism score predicted the
extent to which the emotion prime worked. Benign masochism score corresponded to
increased enjoyment of food shows in the disgust conditions (t = 2.53, p = .0008),
especially for the adventurous eating shows (t = 2.00, p = .008, for the threeway
interaction between emotion manipulation, food show type, and benign masochism
score).
These results must be taken with a grain of salt, since the survey scores were
taken in the same within-subject condition as the responses to the videos. We can
rule out overall differences in BM scores between emotion conditions as the driver of
these effects, however, since the room the subject was in had no effect on their BM
score (M disgust = 35.6, M neutral = 35.8, t = 0.42, p = .67). In spite of the limitations
of this design, these results provide another form of evidence that negative emotion
(in this case, disgust) is a contributing factor to the enjoyment of benign masochistic
activities, and that those who enjoy benign masochistic activities may be especially
prone to using these emotions flexibly to drive hedonic reversals.
We also looked at the Obsessional Impulses to Harm Self/Others Subscale of the
Padua Inventory (Sanavio, 1988; Burns et al., 1996). As may be evident from its
name, this scale was designed to assess impulsivity with regards to self- and other-
81
harm behaviors. Sample items from this inventory call to mind the Christopher
Walken character in Annie Hall, and include: “At certain moments, I am tempted
to tear off my clothes in public” and “While driving, I sometimes feel an impulse to
drive the car into someone or something.” The items were rated from 0 (“Not at all”)
to 5 (“Very much”).
Since the Padua Inventory is a scale typically administered to clinical populations,
it should come as little surprise that few people scored very high on it (the modal score
was, in fact, 0). This meant there was not enough variance for it to be informative
on how individuals varied between conditions (there were no significant interactions
with or main effects of the Padua score). However, overall benign masochism score
was correlated with the Padua score (r = .37, p <.0001), suggesting that an interest
in benign masochism corresponds with an interest in actual masochism.
4.3 Discussion
Placing subjects in a dirty or smelly room while having them watch food-related
shows altered their enjoyment of these shows. Traditional cooking shows were liked
less when the subject was seated in a room that was either visually (and tactilely)
disgusting, or olfactorily disgusting. By contrast, shows depicting consumption of
bizarre or disgusting food items were rated as more enjoyable in the two disgusting
rooms. Both of these findings are consistent with the view we have been advancing
here, that negative emotions, including disgust, are enjoyable in some contexts, and
that emotions, including disgust, impact judgment in a way that is commensurate
with their contextual significance.
These findings provide additional evidence against the view that disgust and other
negative emotions necessarily lead to more negative judgment of targets. Whether
embodied disgust will be assimilated into a judgment at all depends on the target
of judgment: while disgust impeded subjects’ ability to enjoy cooking shows, clean
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and dirty humor were considered equally humorous no matter what room they were
viewed in.
Desensitization to feeling disgusted in the adventurous eating condition cannot
account for the higher ratings in the disgust conditions, as noticing the foul odor—
which is a prerequisite for desensitization—had no impact on enjoyment.
Conscious awareness of the olfactory stimulus played a pivotal, if unpredicted,
role in these results. Odor only affected enjoyment of cooking shows when subjects
were aware of the room’s smell, and only affects enjoyment of adventurous eating
shows when subjects were not aware of the room’s smell. Perhaps these results can
be explained by the relative importance of signal strength across the two video types.
In the traditional cooking shows, where one expects to see mouth-watering recipes,
olfactory cues are most important when they are pressing rather than oblique.9 Con-
versely, olfactory disgust may be enjoyable while engaged with adventurous eating
shows, but only when it’s not overwhelming.
Caution is needed here, however: odor liminality was not experimentally con-
trolled, so we cannot be sure that liminality is driving these group differences. For
instance, maybe people who are hard of smelling take more pleasure in hedonic dis-
gust (such an explanation would be intriguing in its own right). It’s worth noting
that the other major paper on odor liminality’s effect on judgment also determined
its sub- and supraliminal groups based on individual differences in odor sensitivity
differences (d′) rather than directly manipulating them (Li et al., 2007). Nonetheless,
these results point to the importance of liminality in mediating these effects; future
work will be needed to flesh out the role that conscious awareness plays for both
traditional gustatory cognition and for hedonic disgust experiences.
Given that the means in the clean room are the ones that exhibit variance between
the two food-related shows, this raises the question of whether the movement of the
9One has to imagine that the brain is constantly receiving input about mild aversive odors; it
may not be adaptive to tune a food rejection mechanism quite that conservatively.
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manipulation was actually taking place in the neutral rooms. However, the more
likely explanation is that cooking shows are simply more appealing to most people
than the gross-out shows, just as landscape paintings are more appealing to most
people than the grotesque. This interpretation is bolstered by the observation that
baseline liking of the gross-out shows was higher for people who self-reported enjoying
benign masochistic activities more.
Contrary to expectations, disgust had no impact on the evaluation of stand-up
comedy, whether clean or dirty, and regardless of whether subjects were evaluating
the routines for funniness or generic enjoyment. Our failure to uncover a relationship
here may be due to a more a tenuous connection between humor and embodied
disgust. Odors and messy workstations may not be effective at eliciting the discomfort
necessary to prompt (or enhance) a mirth response, in the way that precise verbal
articulations of disgust can. These results are, if nothing else, inconsistent with
the simple mood congruence view, as disgusting stimuli failed to have a detrimental
effect on humor ratings. Embodied disgust, like other emotional states, may be most
effective when it has an evident practical or metaphorical relevance. The findings in
Inbar et al. (2012) are consistent with this possibility: disgusting smells only increase
negative attitudes towards homosexual men, and not lesbians, African-Americans,
or the elderly; Inbar, Pizarro, Knobe, and Bloom (2009) suggest this is because
the physically disgusting aspects of male gay sex are an especially salient aspect of
prejudice against this group. The view that disgust is simply ‘for’ rejection and
avoidance, and influences all judgments accordingly (Lazarus, 1991; Schnall, Haidt,
et al., 2008; Han et al., 2008), appears to be wrong.
These data provide us with a tantalizing glimpse into the individual differences
driving preferences for hedonic disgust activities. People who scored high on the Rozin
Benign Masochism scale not only enjoyed the adventurous eating shows more (and the
traditional cooking shows less), they enjoyed these shows in the disgust conditions
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to a greater extent than did low scorers. This suggests that preference for benign
masochistic activities reflects an increased enjoyment of the negative sensations that
these activities entail.
In light of disgust’s deep-rooted relationship to gustation, it is particularly in-
teresting that disgust can be enjoyable in food-related contexts. Subjects in the
adventurous eating condition, of course, were not being asked to engage in such ac-
tivities themselves. The pleasure derived from these shows may be made possible
the fact that the viewer has some comfortable distance from the events happening
on screen. That said, a subset of the general population enjoy participating in these
activities, and not just watching on the sidelines. Whether disgust plays a role in the
excitement of these pursuits—the initial shudder of disgust they may feel when served
a plate of fish sperm sashimi, or dog meat stew, or durian—remains to be seen.
These results support the view that gross-out television programming derives part
of its appeal from generating disgust. Indeed, this industry might not exist at all were




5.1 Summary of basic findings
Across several studies, we found evidence for the existence of hedonic disgust:
disgust that increases enjoyment of an activity. Contrary to the predictions of tra-
ditional, congruency-based models of emotion, incidental disgust consistently led to
enhanced enjoyment of, or had no effect on, judgments of humor and art.
5.1.1 Humor
After gathering norming data on a corpus of New Yorker cartoons, an experiment
(§2.1) found that disgust primes led to higher funniness ratings for both clean and
dirty cartoons. Another low-arousal negative emotion, sadness, also enhanced the
funniness of the cartoons. A follow-up experiment (§2.2) demonstrated that disgust
primes also lead moral violations to be found funnier, in spite of disgust leading to
disapprobatory judgments of these scenarios in prior research (Wheatley & Haidt,
2005; Schnall, Haidt, et al., 2008). These disgust primes led to lower evaluations in
another judgment domain, making food seem less appetizing (§2.1.3). These results
suggest that, rather than disgust does not have a uniform effect across situations;
rather, it is deployed differently depending on the context in which it is placed.
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While these findings defy congruency-based theories of emotion, they are con-
sistent with an older set of humor studies, which found that negatively valenced
stimuli are just as effective as positive valenced stimuli at eliciting heightened mirth
(Shurcliff, 1968; Cantor et al., 1974). Our research complements the extant literature
by showing that the negative emotional primes need not be high arousal in order to
contribute the the enjoyment of humor.
5.1.2 Art
In Chapter III, we explored the impact that disgust has on judgments of art.
A preliminary study (§3.1) demonstrated that disgust leads to increased liking of
abstract art. The same subjects reported a decreased enjoyment of food in the disgust
condition.
A follow-up study (§3.2) found that an extended set of abstract paintings were
liked more after a disgust prime. No such significant effect was obtained for landscape
paintings. A failure to uncover a significant interaction effect between painting types,
however, suggests that disgust does not have the dramatically differential impact
between abstract and landscape art that was supposed.
Neither abstract nor landscape art typically evokes disgust, so we next tested
this paradigm using grotesque art, which contains disgust-related themes, such as the
disturbing or macabre. We assembled a corpus of grotesque art pieces, and gathered
ratings on a variety of dimensions for these paintings. We then ran a disgust induction
experiment using sentence primes on a subset of these images, and found that subjects
tended to rate the grotesque art higher in the disgust condition, though this trend
was not significant.
In Chapter II, we demonstrated that moral violations are enjoyed more in a dis-
gusted state when subjects are asked to evaluate them for their funniness. We applied
the same reasoning to aesthetic judgments, predicting that disgust would have a dif-
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ferential impact on responses depending on whether subjects were asked to evaluate
how offensive, pretty, or likable the painting was.
When the grotesque paintings are considered as a whole, there was no main effect
of emotion condition by question type (§3.4). However, when the paintings are divided
by their stimulus properties, an intriguing pattern emerges. Very disgusting paintings
are considered more offensive, and low disgust paintings are considered less offensive,
when subjects have been primed with disgust. Paintings low in disgust are considered
less pretty when subjects are disgusted, whereas very disgusting paintings, which are
already at floor on prettiness, exhibit no difference in this dimension. Both types of
painting have exhibit the trend of being liked more in the disgust condition, consistent
with the effect uncovered for abstract art.
Overall, the salutary effect of disgust on judgment of works of art is not as strong
as other examples of hedonic disgust we have observed in this thesis. Across the
types of art we studied, disgust priming provided either a weak or marginal boost to
painting ratings. If nothing else, this provides evidence against the view that disgust
always has a detrimental effect on evaluative judgment, and that moral and aesthetic
judgment make use of emotional information in the same way. The fact that disgust
had a differential impact depending on the aspect of the artwork being evaluated
further suggests that task plays an important role in how disgust is incorporated into
downstream judgments.
5.1.3 Embodied Disgust
In Chapter IV, we examined hedonic disgust using additional mood induction
methods whose affective component would be especially dominant. We collected rat-
ings for stand-up comedy routines (dirty and clean), cooking shows, and adventurous
eating shows while people were sitting in either clean, dirty, or smelly rooms. As
before, our disgust primes did not have a differential effect on comedy depending on
88
what type it was. However, unlike our previous findings, our disgust conditions had
no impact on funniness judgments.
Our embodied emotion induction method was effective at impacting judgments of
food-related TV shows. As predicted, sitting in a smelly or dirty room had a negative
impact on enjoyment of traditional cooking shows. However, for adventurous eating
shows, whose appeal lies in their ability to shock and disturb, a dirty or smelly
setting enhanced enjoyment. There was an interaction effect between odor liminality
and type of food-related programming: odor only had a detrimental effect on ratings
of traditional cooking shows if subjects were aware of the room’s smell, and odor only
had a favorable effect on ratings of adventurous eating shows when subjects weren’t
aware of it.
The discovery that people can enjoy disgust in the domain of gustation is espe-
cially interesting given that food is thought to play a central role in disgust’s evolved
rejection mechanism (Rozin et al., 1999). Thus, disgust’s flexibility to give rise to
pleasure holds even in the emotion’s most immediate domain of function. This study
also shows that hedonic disgust is not limited to verbal cues, which have a milder
emotional impact. Since people rarely watch shows in a vacuum devoid of environ-
mental cues, these results open up possibilities for the practical impact of such cues on
enjoyment of TV shows. Finally, the lack of impact these cues had on humor judg-
ments suggests that there are boundary conditions on how disgust impacts humor
perception (discussed in more detail below).
5.1.4 Disgust and Morality
One surprise of these studies was a failure to consistently replicate a finding that
has been demonstrated several times by other researchers, that disgust makes moral
judgments more severe (Wheatley & Haidt, 2005; Schnall, Haidt, et al., 2008; Eskine,
Kacinik, & Prinz, 2011). In a study mixed with other types of judgments (§3.1),
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moral violations were the sole object of judgment not affected by the disgust primes.
Highly disgusting artistic images were deemed more offensive when preceded by dis-
gust stimuli, but this pattern reversed for artwork that was not disgusting (§3.4).
These results are not as inconsistent with the literature as they at first seem.
Multiple authors have reported that only a subset of their moral problems were sus-
ceptible to disgust primes (Schnall, Haidt, et al., 2008; Horberg et al., 2009; Inbar et
al., 2012). Those who have failed to find a consistent impact of disgust across moral
scenarios have attempted to explain this failure as a matter of disgust selectively
impacting only certain types of moral transgression, for example purity violations
(Horberg et al., 2009; Inbar et al., 2012). Such an explanation would count as a
special case of the general phenomenon whereby emotional states are only attributed
to their target to the extent that the emotion is deemed applicable to it (Schwarz,
2012). Disgust’s impact on moral judgment appears to be more nuanced than the
simple congruence-based model allows; the exact contour of these nuances remains
for future research to uncover.
5.1.5 Other Null Effects
While we uncovered several instances of hedonic disgust in aesthetic and humor-
ous contexts, our disgust induction methods sometimes failed to have the predicted
impact. Two emotion induction methods generated null effects on humor judgments.
When we induced disgust using environmental cues (either a dirty room or a smelly
room), humor ratings were unaffected, whereas ratings of food-based TV shows were.
Similarly, enjoyment of cartoons was unperturbed when subjects used a cued recall
task of a past disgusting event (see Appendix C). Given that conceptual replications
using the same sentence stimuli are effective at enhancing funniness (see §§2.1, 2.2,
3.1), the null results using different emotion induction stimuli provide us with a hint
at the mechanism underlying our effects. Perhaps it is the part of disgust that makes
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us nervous or uncomfortable, which is made especially salient by the verbal articu-
lation of disgusting stimuli, that is driving the effect in humor judgments. Such an
explanation would still revolve around deriving pleasure from unpleasant feelings, but
it would locate the source of the effect in a more specific element of disgust.
A failure to uncover a difference in the control and experimental conditions could
also be masking a more complex underlying process. For example, perhaps some
priming methodologies (or judgment types) draw on dimensions of disgust which
facilitate both enjoyment and repugnance. The two effects would then wash out in
the final judgment. While we do not know whether such a mechanism could account
for the null results reported here, this explanation would help explain why we would
fail to get either the predicted effect or the canonical emotion-congruent effect.
In sum, incidental disgust can make judgments more positive, more negative, or
have no net impact at all. The effect of disgust appears to be contingent on a complex
set of factors, including the stimulus being evaluated, the aspect of the stimulus being
evaluated, and on the manner in which disgust is elicited.
5.2 Caveats and limitations
The findings presented here have very little precedent in the literature. As such,
they leave a wide margin for speculation.
One important caveat is that we do not have a definitive picture of whether our
subjects were feeling disgust, as most of our studies did not measure self-report disgust
in subjects during the experiment. The one priming experiment that gathered self-
report data from subjects, in Appendix C, did not demonstrate a main effect of
emotion condition or an interaction between self-report and emotion condition. We
nonetheless have a few reasons to believe that our primes were eliciting the target
emotion. Images of food were deemed less appetizing when preceded by verbal disgust
primes (§2.1.2) and cooking shows were enjoyed less when in the presence of disgusting
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olfactory and environmental cues (§4.2). Additionally, the verbal disgust stimuli were
judged by an independent group of subjects to be more disgusting than the verbal
neutral stimuli (§2.1.3). This does not tell us whether subjects in our paradigms were
experiencing disgust as such, but it does at least provide evidence that the disgust
primes behave the way we would expect them to in normal settings.
A failure to uncover increased self-report disgust in future disgust manipulations,
however, would still allow for the possibility that disgust was unconsciously guiding
their choices. Previous research suggests that we need not experience feelings in order
to be influenced by them (Winkielman, Berridge, & Wilbarger, 2005; Winkielman &
Berridge, 2004), and that being unaware of primes can actually bolster their effect
(Schwarz & Clore, 1983; Murphy & Zajonc, 1993). Schnall, Haidt, et al. (2008) and
Lerner et al. (2004) found that, even though their subjects did not report higher
disgust in the experimental condition, the disgust manipulation still exacted an in-
fluence on decisions in the predicted direction. Work presented here (with olfactory
cues; §4.2) suggests that, at least in some cases of hedonic disgust, a lack of conscious
awareness of an emotion can facilitate its effect.
While our studies repeatedly uncovered evidence for the existence of enjoyment
enhanced by disgust, they did not show that disgust primes always lead to such an
enhancement. For example, while verbal disgust primes consistently made subsequent
humorous material funnier, olfactory and environmental cues had no discernible ef-
fect on humorous material (§§2.1.5, 2.2.3, 4.2). Similarly, disgust had no effect on
enjoyment of landscape art (§3.2), and only marginal enhancement of enjoyment of
grotesque art (§3.4). It seems there are important boundary conditions on how and
whether disgust will influence our enjoyment of humor and art, which we are only
just beginning to sort out.
To a certain extent, our interpretation of these results has just as much to do with
how priming methodology works as it does with how disgust works. An assumption
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we have made throughout this document is that incidental emotion can be treated
as equivalent to emotions integral to the target of judgment. The question of how
these two might function differently has not been systematically studied, though the
available evidence suggests that the two are comparable in their effects. For example,
trait disgust sensitivity (integral) and disgust induction with an odor (incidental) both
increase anti-gay sentiment (Inbar et al., 2009, 2012). In our studies, the dirtiness of a
cartoon (integral) and verbal disgust primes (incidental) both increased the funniness
of a cartoon (§2.1.1, 2.1).
As discussed in Chapter I, one reason that incidental mood inductions are com-
monly used is they provide a means of teasing apart causality, a virtue absent in
correlational studies. Future investigations need not choose between correlational
data and experimental manipulation of incidental emotions. An alternative method
would be to make the object of judgment systematically more disgusting: adding a
line to make a dirty joke even raunchier, or a visual shot to make the adventurous eat-
ing show even grosser. Such manipulations are generally more difficult to implement
than incidental emotion inductions—close attention is required to not systematically
change other factors about the experimental stimuli, such as making them longer,
or less natural—but they would complement the existing studies. A good example
of this method from the literature comes from Shurcliff (1968), who made subjects
anxious by telling them they would have to handle a tame rat or draw blood from a
vicious rat. When subjects went to the cage to perform the task, they found a rubber
rat waiting. Subjects were then asked how funny the situation was. In this case,
the situation eliciting the anxiety was the same as the situation being judged, thus
allowing for stronger conclusions about the functional relationship between the two.
Beyond its requirement that we assume incidental and integral emotions are equiv-
alent, mood induction is a finicky methodology for a host of reasons. If subjects
become aware of the prime, or aware that the prime may affect behavior, they will
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often adjust their judgments to compensate for it (Schwarz & Clore, 1983; Bargh,
1994; Higgins, 1996). In addition, the prime must be strong enough to drown out the
ambient noise of all the other incidental factors that are going into the behavioral out-
put. Successful priming methodology boils down to a delicate balancing act between
getting a prime that is strong enough to be heard above the din, but not so loud
that we notice its presence and correct for it. Some disgust researchers have reported
that their attempts with more powerful disgust primes have failed for just this reason
(Inbar et al., 2012), and others, who have attempted to modulate the quantity of
emotion in order to give rise to a commensurate modulation in the direction of the
effect, have failed (Schnall, Haidt, et al., 2008; Shurcliff, 1968).
Technically, we did not show that people enjoy feeling disgusted, only that they
enjoy certain activities shortly after being disgusted (or primed with disgusting stim-
uli). Since disgust comprises several dimensions beyond its negative hedonic tone, we
are not able to pinpoint negative affective valence as a determinant in the observed
effects. Negative affect is the most obvious shared trait between sadness and dis-
gust primes, both of which led to increased funniness ratings (§2.1). But they share
other traits, such as both being more interesting than the neutral primes, and having
greater emotional intensity than the neutral primes. These studies have succeeded in
showing that incidental disgust and sadness primes can lead to increased enjoyment of
activities, which is a novel finding, but they cannot make any definitive claims about
whether it is the negative affective experience itself that leads disgusting stimuli to
be enjoyed in these contexts.
5.3 The How and the Why of Hedonic Disgust
The studies in this dissertation were chiefly concerned with demonstrating the
existence of hedonic disgust. Nonetheless, the studies allow us to sketch a rough
outline of what the mechanism of hedonic disgust might look like.
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First, these results are not the result of transference of arousal. The most obvious
reason for this is disgust is a low arousal emotion, both when measured by self-report
(Stark et al., 2005; Fontaine et al., 2007) and psychophysiology (Levenson, 1992).
Disgust is not just low arousal for an emotion, it lowers measures of autonomic arousal
such as heart rate and skin temperature when compared to baseline neutral states
(Ekman et al., 1983; Levenson et al., 1990; Stark et al., 2005). Likewise, sadness, the
classic “low arousal” emotion, has a facilitative effect on humor enjoyment, making
arousal a poor explanation for this effect (§2.1).
Second, these results are unlikely to be an artifact of a generalized contrast effect.
This is because the objects of judgment are sometimes unpleasant themselves (e.g.
the moral violations in §2.2, the grotesque paintings in §3.4), and emotion-congruent
effects obtain for select pleasant activities (e.g. food judgments in §§2.1.2, 4.2). An
appeal to a contrast effect would not explain this pattern of responses. Nonetheless,
it may be the case that ‘contrast’, broadly construed, is valued for certain types of
judgment. Theories of humor variously stipulate surprise, relief, and incongruency
as a source of mirth (Freud, 1905/1963; Koestler, 1964; Berlyne, 1972; Apter, 1982;
Hurley et al., 2011); these are all properties that negative emotions could have if
placed in a humorous context. It has also been suggested that the appeal of benign
masochistic phenomena derives from the pleasure of removing the offending stimulus
(Burke, 1759/1998; Bloom, 2010; Rozin, Guillot, et al., 2010). To the extent that
contrast plays a role in these effects, it may speak to the importance of contrast
dynamics to the phenomenon, rather than an artifact of the research design.
Emotions comprise several dimensions: the way they feel (affect), cognitive ap-
praisals, physiological responses, and behavioral output. Many of these dimensions
are shared among more than one different emotion. For example, both fear and anger
increase heart rate (Ekman et al., 1983), both hope and jealousy are characterized
by feelings of uncertainty (Fontaine et al., 2007), and both disgust and guilt typically
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lead to avoidance (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). The generally combinatorial nature
of emotions has led many contemporary theorists of emotion to argue for an infinite
spectrum of emotion comprised of constituent parts, with no basic emotion under-
neath (Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003; Barrett, 2006). While the behavioral and neural
evidence increasingly favors this view (Barrett & Wager, 2006; Wilson-Mendenhall,
Barrett, & Barsalou, in press), it is nonetheless the case that some traits can be
unique to, even characteristic of, an emotion (or a single cluster of very similar emo-
tions). For example, only disgust leads to the activation of the gag reflex, to implicit
beliefs about biological contamination (Mulkens, Jong, & Merckelbach, 1996; Brown
& Harris, 2012), and, perhaps most obviously, to the canonical disgust face (disgust
is the only emotion that raises the levator labii muscle; Vrana, 1993). The fact that
emotions can contain idiosyncratic properties may contribute to the popular notion
that emotions have an essential, indivisible core.
Since disgust contains emotion-specific properties, there could be aspects of it
that uniquely contribute to the hedonic reversal, especially in specific cases. It’s
quite possible, for instance, that disgust is the only negative emotion that potentiates
enjoyment of adventurous eating shows. At the same time, since disgust is partially
comprised of units that are shared among other emotions, disgust need not be ex-
ceptional in its ability to give rise to positive evaluations. If the cause of the effects
reported here are the result of traits that disgust shares with other emotions, then
any other emotion could have the same effect on judgments, and for the same reason.
One explanation for why disgust, sadness (§2.1), fear (Shurcliff, 1968), and horror
(Cantor et al., 1974) all increase judged funniness is that they all operate by way
of the same underlying mechanism, such as that humor is enhanced by incongruity,
emotional intensity, or mild doses of misery (or all three). Even if a shared cognitive
mechanism cannot explain all these effects, disgust is almost certainly not unique in















Figure 5.1: Schematic representations of how information is stored in the brain, with
semantic and emotional information both susceptible to spreading activation.
full gamut of possible negative affective states, including sadness, fear, disgust, anger,
and pain (Rozin, Guillot, et al., 2010).
So far in this document we have not delved into what the cognitive mechanism
could be that leads to hedonic reversals. While it is too early to make any strong
commitments to what this mechanism might be, in the interest of constructing a
theoretical foundation for understanding our results, we will present one possibility.
A major account for semantic priming is spreading activation, wherein the acti-
vation of one concept triggers semantically related concepts (Collins & Loftus, 1975).
If a person has just read the word nurse, concepts such as doctor, shark, and Ratched
will become more accessible (see Figure 5.1). This organization of knowledge ex-
plains the reduced reaction time between semantically primed words and increased
likelihood of filling in word-stem completion tasks with semantically related concepts
(Meyer & Schvaneveldt, 1971; Warrington & Weiskrantz, 1970).
Emotion priming appears to proceed in much the same way, with activation of
one node in the network potentiating the concomitants of that emotion. If a person
has just read one of our verbal disgust stimuli, “Her nails are grimy”, this sentence
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activates a constellation of related nodes (Figure 5.1). These nodes could include
conceptual beliefs (such as contamination), affective sensations (feelings of nausea),
somatic effects (activation of facial muscles), and behavioral tendencies (avoidance,
cleansing). An executive mechanism is required to mediate whether any of those acti-
vated nodes will be incorporated into downstream processes, including any judgments
we happen to be making during this time frame. Feelings-as-information theory, which
stipulates that we decide whether a feeling is relevant before applying it to a judg-
ment, effectively posits such an executive mechanism (Schwarz, 2012). Other social
cognition theorists arrive at similar conclusions, such as Higgins (1996), who argues
that accessible knowledge must have applicability and judged usability in order to
be effective. The characterization of emotion priming as comprising early activation
which is immediately followed by pruning for the applicable content is consistent
with evidence from the semantic priming literature, which shows that lexical activa-
tions are suppressed shortly after they are deemed irrelevant to the context (Swinney,
1979).
Thus, only a subset of the activated nodes from the emotion prime may be selected
for inclusion in the subsequent judgment. In the example given, the aptness executor
may consider the discomfort from the aversiveness of the prime, or the taboo violation
of not having clean hands, or the emotional intensity, as pertinent to the assessment
of funniness in a temporally close punchline. Activations in other nodes not deemed
relevant in the context are suppressed or ignored. Likewise, when judging the moral
probity of homosexuality, activations to the contamination and avoidance nodes may
be considered relevant (at least by some), which would then feed into a negative
evaluation.
This theory has several strengths. It explains the data in a way that is consistent
with several disparate but related models in the literature. It also provides a frame-
work for understanding why emotion priming is often (but not always) congruent: the
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spreading activation is, in essence, a network of congruent nodes (although there are
bound to be exceptions: just as “black” primes “white”, feelings of dirtiness prime
cleanliness behavior; Zhong & Liljenquist, 2006). When we speak of emotion priming
we can retain the fundamental idea of that, least in the early stages, emotions prime
conceptually related networks. It also specifies a cognitive stage that departs from
simple congruency theories (e.g. Bower, 1981, 1991), by positing an intermediary
between the activated nodes and the subsequent judgments. This would allow the
same emotion prime to give rise to completely different kinds of judgment across
different contexts. This theory further affords that conceptual replications with the
same emotion (e.g. two different disgust manipulations) could have differential ef-
fects, since these manipulations will inevitably prime slightly different portions of
the network. Finally, this theory has the power to explain why incidental emotion
primes and integral emotion activations are so often confounded, since they would
both trigger spreading activations in emotion networks in close temporal proximity
to the judgment.
The model described above provides a proximate explanation for how hedonic
disgust could be cognitively instantiated. We might also ask why minds might be
designed this way, allowing for situations where discomfort (or some other aspect of
disgust) gives rise to a favorable evaluation. There are a few possibilities, but we will
discuss the most likely.
Several scholars have identified the removal of an unpleasant stimulus as a poten-
tial source of aesthetic pleasure (Burke, 1759/1998; Bloom, 2010; Rozin, Guillot, et
al., 2010) and mirth (Freud, 1905/1963). Under this view, we do not enjoy negative
sensations so much as how we feel once the negative sensation is removed. This view is
consistent with research showing that the subjective experience of pleasure and pain
is contingent on the preceding stimuli; for example, cold water which is normally
aversive will seem pleasant if one’s hand has just been immersed in even colder water
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(Anderson & Pennebaker, 1980). A problem with this view is that people enjoy these
activities while they are still happening; we do not enjoy spicy food only after we’ve
swallowed it, or the medical exhibit only after we’ve left the room. Nonetheless, a
more subtle form of relief could be at play, for example in the knowledge that, though
one is feeling fear on a roller coaster, there is no real danger, and though one feels
nauseated at the thought of eating bugs, they are perfectly harmless to eat.
A theme universal to almost all hedonic reversals is that they deliver negative
sensations in a safe context.1 The low risk aspect of these activities has lead some
to suggest that their function is to allow us to master our emotions, or practice
these scenarios in a safe context (Bloom, 2010). This view is echoed in theories of
humor that center around its role in play behavior (Darwin, 1872/2002; Berlyne, 1969;
Ramachandran, 1998; Gervais & Wilson, 2005). While there may be some truth to
this, it doesn’t seem likely that it would be adaptive to learn to temper our emotions
with such simulations (especially if the result of such simulations is desensitization
to their impact). There is little evidence that these activities do have beneficial or
pedagogical effects, though this is a line of research in its early stages of exploration
(Mar & Oatley, 2008).
A related idea is that, in a more general sense, information is valuable. Exploratory
behavior is essential to most organisms so that they can procure resources from their
environment. Thus, stimulation, especially novel stimulation, can be rewarding even
when it is slightly unpleasant. Rats, for instance, will forgo a food reward for the
chance to explore new environments. Many theories of motivation posit that there is
reward simply to arousal and stimulation, and is not limited to experiences that are
purely positive (Hull, 1943; Hebb, 1955; Berlyne, 1969). In this sense, all emotional
states, regardless of affective valence, serve as a heuristic that new information is at
1Not all examples of benign masochism are risk-free. For example, skydiving carries with it a
.001% chance of death, which is surely higher than staying at home on the couch. Then again,
skydiving is substantially safer than jumping out of an airplane without a parachute, and it delivers
nearly all of the same thrill, so comparatively speaking it is benign.
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hand. The value of emotional information is implicit in our interest in emotionally-
charged images: when people are allowed to view pictures freely, they spend the least
time looking at emotionally neutral pictures, looking longer even at the negative
valenced and low arousal ones (Bradley et al., 1992; Lang, 1995).
It’s possible, then, that benign masochism is a function of our desire for novelty
and sensation, which itself reflects a drive to learn about the world around us. Hedonic
disgust may have less to do with the need to practice simulations in a safe context
than it does with the simple joys of new sensations (which are all the more palatable
when they pose no immediate danger to us). This would not be inconsistent with
accounts about hedonic reversal that identify the locus of reward in the curiosity and
interest they give rise to (Carroll, 1990).
These are not mutually exclusive explanations; any or all of them could account
for the existence of benign masochism. What these explanations do give us a sense of
is that hedonic disgust, far from being paradoxical, can be the result of an adaptive
feature of the human mind.
We are only just beginning to get an idea of how negative emotions like disgust
can be enjoyable. Although our current understanding of this phenomenon is admit-
tedly incomplete, this line of work opens up new, previously unexplored territory in
emotions research, which will eventually allow us to give a complete account of the






These sentences were modified and augmented from those used in Schnall, Benton,
and Harvey (2008, personal communication).
Disgust Neutral Sadness
soil contaminated the became are twins they identical was all she alone
fruit disintegrated the mushy twirled umbrella her beach bleak looks the future
patient the hemorrhaging was outlets are electric useful somewhat looks she blue
messy is desk your are pillows the cotton spirit broken her was
sullied are linens their is complex plotline the brokenhearted left she him
was pond the murky rented lamp the was the crestfallen children were
smelled cabbage the nasty athletes the were swift at night cries she
was bread the moldy ink he invisible used feeling been he’s dejected
armpits sweaty her were some she bought batteries teenager depressed was the
grimy are nails her was standard the service was the town desolate
tainted they water drank the woman spoke silent despair her she hides
is dusty their house surface the glossy gleamed men they were desperate
felt his hands grubby expensive her was ring face woeful was her
was laundry the stinky natural movements her were was the drab decor
noxious was sweat his money the was spent was aftermath devastating the
sky hazy the was cards they late played were despondent orphans the
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Disgust Neutral Sadness
was stench the repugnant over the is contest dog faithful died his
everywhere urine the splattered was change there gradual is his dim outlook
consumed meat he spoiled bunnies are the furry was disappointed terribly she
unsanitary the hospital was tree short grew the was accident disastrous the
was apartment his squalid always are they active the was discouraging news
smudged was face his the ball bounced red was disenchanted the poet
knuckles her were scaly had he hair bleached his dismal prospects were
he the sheets soiled she keys found gold her was pointless distress
vile the slug writhed uncle his famous is were eyes her downcast
dingy the is basement sturdy plastic was it downhearted was he quite
was foul the odor secure is password the broken dreams her were
was blanket cruddy the quotation the was literary day dreary the was
is procedure the unhygienic was frosty windshield the were wasted efforts their
very are birds disgusting read books they long felt empty life his
was keyboard the grungy detailed is the design she low energy had
bloody ached the tendons running often she goes test the he failed
was festering pus the package was the transported failure was a he
pipe was scummy the dynamic group the was she forget to wants
the musty was suitcase style his modern was looked the figures forlorn
pigs creatures dirty are him calculus basic confused can friends drift apart
looked eyes cloudy her he hardly fast was at he frowned her
has pink he eye lives her near he gloomy the clouds were
the oozed infected wound was wagon the covered seem they both glum
became the muddy field his he findings recorded end good times all
was attic the infested was wise prophet the voice was his grave
wall defiled he the are loud their instruments grieved the old women
milk putrid the was the porcelain are dishes luck has unfortunate he
lips were scabby his local thrived the market animals zoo unhappy are
rotting fish was the the long was lecture was uninviting the atmosphere
feathers oily were its sparkly wore she accessories wept widow softly the
clammy her skin was the dog barked cute was play tragic the
the was sewage green they up early closed was the priest troubled
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Disgust Neutral Sadness
was the rancid beef priceless artifact the was the is grim diagnosis
was trashcan leaking the questions were his incessant his heavy was heart
were membranes the mucous birds large ostriches are story is heartbreaking her
fingers got his inky chivalrous intrigued his manners was the saxophonist home
stained was underwear the worsened windy the weather the hopeless was situation
was skin his flaking was miser the thrifty words deeply hurt their
was the decomposing log mobile robot the is felt terribly isolated he
was moist her tongue the close shot was was joyless her life
dank felt office her studied languages foreign he their misfortune lamented they
was mealy the orange immense the were winnings is shepherd lonely the
the lockerroom reeks filthy lively was conversation the hope all lost she
was buffet revolting the was smooth line the melancholy she feels often
slovenly his is sister thorough ceased the exploration miserable was boy the
greasy was engine the seemed future clear seemed missed friends her she
were maggots the slimy the triangles tiny were always moping is he
mucky leaves the were arbitrary is symbol the morose was he quite
the is bay polluted the invented he microphone played he mournful music
got our sticky hair is resume impressive his her no one understands
got his infected wound the is beeping alarm was an she outcast
cawed the crow black slacks wore white she was sky the overcast
the was decaying flesh children the eager were wage pitiful the wage
cigarettes he smoked unfiltered wore suits he tailored overwhelmed them the recession
worsened blotchy complexion her differences matter small don’t rejected the boy her
limbs pasty his rippled work comprehensive is her felt sad quite they
snot gooey dripped the the was new building sank boy’s heart the
is chimney the sooty glowing the light flickered serious was his sentence
became the soggy toast he cash budgeted enough girl’s sobbed the mother
motel opened seedy the boyfriend is her tall solemn procession the was
was slobbery the dog clever was magician the wailed sorrow they with
was odor the sickening muscular man the is the was sullen dean
hair is unkempt her wide the is river confession her tearful was




Below are the 42 ridiculous moral violations developed for use in Study 2.2. Some
of these vignettes come from, or are based on, stimuli used in previous moral psychol-
ogy research (see numerical footnotes for indication of source). Figure B.1 presents
the wrongness and funniness ratings for each of the items below. Figure B.1 also
demonstrates that greater funniness ratings do not necessarily mean a lesser per-
ception of moral violation. In fact, some of the funniest vignettes were also judged
the most wrong (notably “Lifeboat”), calling into question claims that only harmless
moral violations can be seen as funny (McGraw & Warren, 2010).
1 Lifeboat ∗∗
A man, along with several children, is on a lifeboat which had es-
caped from a burning cruise ship. The man soon discovers a hole on
the side of the lifeboat. Seawater has been trickling into the boat
through this hole. If the hole is not sealed soon, the lifeboat will be
sitting dangerously low in the water with the risk of sinking. The
man realizes the silicone dildo he had brought with him on the cruise
would fit perfectly into the hole. However, if he does this he will risk
all the children on the raft seeing his sex toy. The man decides to
plug the hole with his dildo.1
∗∗Indicates stories selected, after norming, for Study 2.2
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2 Vaccine Test ∗∗
A deadly virus has spread throughout a church hospital, infecting
both patients and healthcare personnel. A doctor working on a cure
has developed two substances in his laboratory. He knows that one
of them is the vaccine, but in his haste he has forgotten which one.
Consuming the non-vaccine will lead to permanent swelling of the
genitalia which will require amputation. The doctor has two former
priests under his care. In the interest of saving as many lives as
possible, he injects each of the priests with one of the two substances
while they are sleeping.1
3 Footbridge ∗∗
A runaway trolley is heading down the tracks toward five workmen
who will be killed if the trolley proceeds on its present course. Donny
is on a footbridge over the tracks, in between the approaching trolley
and the five workmen. Next to him on this footbridge is a very fat
man. The only way to save the lives of the five workmen is for Donny
to push him off the bridge and onto the tracks below where his large
body will stop the trolley. Donny pushes the fat man off the bridge
in order to save the five workmen.1
4 Taxes
A middle school teacher is finding it hard to make ends meet. This
problem is made worse by his sex addiction. It occurs to him that
he can file claims for reimbursement if he declares some of his private
expenses as work-related expenses. For example, he claims that the
pornography he bought are educational videos for his students. He
also alleges that the condoms and inflatable doll he purchased for
himself are used for sex education in his classroom.1
5 Sculpture
Elaine is visiting the holy site of her ancestors. The site overlooks
a valley where her car is parked. Elaine notices that a boulder has
begun rolling down the hill towards her car. The only way to save the
car is to push the site’s most holy artifact, a 3,000-year-old sculpture
of the god of fertility, so that it rolls into the valley and blocks the
boulder. Elaine pushes the sculpture into the valley to spare the car,
even though she knows her ancestor’s sacred relic will be destroyed.1
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6 Safari
Mike, his wife and his 3-year old son have been taken hostage by a
group of terrorists. One of the terrorists develops a crush on Mike.
The terrorist informs him that his leader intends to kill his whole
family the following morning. He is prepared to help them escape,
but only if Mike is willing to masturbate with his son’s teddy bear in
front of his family and the terrorist. Mike eagerly complies, and his
family escapes, leaving the teddy bear behind.1
7 Architect ∗∗
Mitch is a young architect visiting a construction site with his boss.
Mitch’s boss is a pompous man who irritates all his employees, in-
cluding Mitch. It occurs to Mitch that if he were to grease the floor
on the building’s porch, his boss would slip and fall. Mitch puts his
plan into action and the boss tumbles to the ground in front of the
other workers, ripping his pants on the way down.1
8 Dead Rats (formerly Hired Rapist) ∗∗
Bob feels that his wife no longer appreciates him. Bob’s wife is afraid
of rats, and years ago when she found a dead rat in the kitchen, he
comforted her. They were much closer then. Bob devises a plan to
regain his wife’s affection: he will put dead rats in the bread box, in
the pie, in the cereal, in the freezer. Upon hearing the screams from
the kitchen, Bob will return swiftly to her side to comfort her, and
she will once again appreciate her husband.1
9 Sewage (formerly Standard Fumes)
Walter is the night watchman in a hospital. Due to an accident in
the building next door, raw sewage is pouring in through the hospi-
tal’s ventilation system. In a certain room of the hospital are three
patients. In another room there is a single patient. If Walter does
nothing the raw sewage will pour into the room with the three pa-
tients and cause their deaths. The only way to avoid the deaths of
these patients is to hit an emergency switch, which will cause the
sewage to bypass the room containing the three patients. As a result
of doing this, the sewage will pour into the room containing the single
patient, causing his death. Walter decides to hit the switch.1
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10 Sexual Favor (formerly Illegal Lunch) ∗∗
Pamela is a lawyer working on a big case, and she has evidence that
would exonerate her client. For an obscure legal reason, she is not
allowed to present her evidence to the jury. The judge presiding over
the trial happens to be her old professor from law school. Pamela
remembers that when he was her professor, he often flirted with her.
So Pamela goes to the judge’s chambers one evening and offers to
perform oral sex on him. The next day, the judge announces that
Pamela can present the evidence at court after all.1
11 Plane Crash
Ben’s plane has crashed in the Himalayas. The only survivors are
Ben and a young girl. Their only chance at survival is to make it
to a small a village on the other side of the mountain, several days
away. The girl has a broken leg and cannot move very quickly. Her
chances of surviving the journey are essentially zero. Without food,
Ben will probably die as well. The girl is exhausted and implores her
companion to sacrifice her, pointing out that her young flesh will give
Ben the energy he needs to get to the village. So Ben kills the girl
and eat her remains over the next few days.1
12 Preventing the Spread ∗∗
Annie is a waitress. She overhears one of her customers say that he
is about to go to jail and that in his last forty-eight hours of freedom
he plans to infect as many people as possible with HIV. She knows
him well enough to know that he is telling the truth and that he has
access to many potential victims. Annie happens to know that this
customer has a very strong allergy to poppy seeds. If he eats even
one he will go into convulsions and have to be hospitalized for at
least forty-eight hours. So Annie sprinkles a few poppy seeds into the
man’s soup before serving it to him.1
13 Bomb
David is negotiating with a powerful and determined terrorist who is
about to set off a bomb in a crowded area. David’s one advantage is
that he has the terrorist’s teenage son in his custody. The terrorist
comes from a culture where homosexuality is a sin. David knows he
can break down the terrorist’s resistance by making the teenage son
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drink a cup of semen. David contacts the terrorist over the satellite
hook-up that he has established and, in front of the camera, forces
the boy to drink his own semen. David threatens to subject the boy
to more depraved acts until the terrorist relents.1
14 Lawrence of Arabia
Ghengis is the leader of a small army that consists of warriors from
two tribes, the hill tribe and the river tribe. Ghengis belongs to
neither tribe. During the night a hill tribesman got into an argument
with a river tribesman because the river tribesman slept with his wife.
The hill tribe is furious and will go to war with the river tribe unless
the adulterer is castrated and the tribe gets to take his dismembered
penis back to their hut as a trophy. In order to avoid conflict, Ghengis
publicly castrates the adulterer.1
15 Sophie’s Choice
It is wartime and Sophie and her two sons are living in a territory
that has been occupied by the enemy. At the enemy’s headquarters
is a doctor who performs humiliating experiments on children. He
intends to perform a genetics experiment on one of her sons that
will cause him to grow a long, rodent-like tail. The doctor will allow
Sophie to choose which of her children will be experimented upon. She
has twenty-four hours to bring one of her children to his laboratory.
If she refuses to bring one of them in he will find them both and
experiment on both of them. Sophie decides to bring her younger son
to the laboratory, because he is not as handsome as the older son.1
16 Sacrifice ∗∗
Sara is a devout Christian. She, her husband, and her four children
are crossing a mountain range during a camping trip. They have
inadvertently set up camp on land owned by a mentally deranged
man. This man says he will rape Sara unless she dresses up like a
dominatrix and whips her husband and children while shouting Bible
verses at them. Sara agrees to this arrangement so that the man will
let her go.1
17 Poison ∗∗
Steve and Ken are roommates. There is a rat in their apartment, and
Ken made some cookies with rat poison to kill the rat before leaving
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for the weekend. Steve sees the cookies on the counter. Not realizing
that the cookies contain poison, Steve eats the cookie and suffers from
dysentery all weekend.2
18 Stand ∗∗
John is walking through a carnival. He comes to a stand where you
can punch a mechanical target to win a prize. Unbeknownst to John,
the owner of the stand happens to be squatting beneath the target.
When John hits the target to win the prize, he also hits the owner
and breaks his nose.2
19 Family Dog
A family’s dog was killed by a car in front of their house. The family
had heard that in Korea people consider dog meat a delicacy, and
they were curious about what it tasted like. So they cut up the body
and cooked it and ate it for dinner.3
20 Kitten
Matthew is playing with his new kitten late one night. He is wear-
ing only his boxer shorts, and the kitten sometimes walks over his
genitals. Eventually, this arouses him, and he begins to rub his bare
genitals along the kitten’s body. The kitten purrs, and seems to enjoy
the contact. Matthew figures no one is getting hurt, so he continues
rubbing himself against the kitten.3
21 Pups
Amanda sees some puppies playing next to her driveway again and
wants to kill them. She decides to go to the hardware store to buy
some poison that she thinks will work on the puppies. As she pulls
out of her garage, the wheel slips and she drives off to the side of the
driveway. All the puppies are crushed and killed under the car. With




Jon goes to the supermarket once a week and buys a chicken carcass.
But before cooking the chicken, he has sexual intercourse with it. He
then cooks it and eats it.5
23 Flag
Liane is cleaning out her closet, and she finds an old American flag.
She doesn’t want the flag anymore, so she cuts it up into pieces and
uses the rags to clean her toilet.5
24 Promise ∗∗
An old woman was dying, and on her deathbed she asked her son to
promise that he would visit her grave every week. The son loved his
mother very much, so he promised to visit her grave every week. But
after the mother died, her son didn’t keep his promise, because he
was too busy playing World of Warcraft.5
25 Incest
Julie and Mark, who are brother and sister are traveling together in
France. They are both on summer vacation from college. One night
they are staying alone in a cabin near the beach. They decide that it
would be interesting and fun if they tried making love. At very least
it would be a new experience for each of them. Julie was already
taking birth control pills, but Mark uses a condom too, just to be
safe. They both enjoy it, but they decide not to do it again. They
keep that night as a special secret between them, which makes them
feel even closer to each other.6
26 Cannibalism
Jennifer works in a medical school pathology lab as a research assis-
tant. The lab prepares human cadavers that are used to teach medical
students about anatomy. The cadavers come from people who had
donated their body to science for research. One night Jennifer is leav-
ing the lab when she sees a body that is going to be discarded the next
day. Jennifer was a vegetarian, for moral reasons. She thought it was
wrong to kill animals for food. But then, when she saw a body about
to be cremated, she thought it was irrational to waste perfectly edible
meat. So she cut off a piece of flesh, and took it home and cooked it.
The person had died recently of a heart attack, and she cooked the
meat thoroughly, so there was no risk of disease.6
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27 Weight Loss Drug
Susan is an inventor. She has not been happy with her looks, mostly
because she is somewhat overweight. One day, she mixes together
some chemicals that she believes might cause significant and per-
manent weight loss. Susan takes some, and within a day, notices a
substantial drop in her weight. Though Susan doesn’t recall the exact
ingredients or their proportions, she has some of the mixed formula
left. If Susan takes the rest of the mixture, she will shave off exactly
what she wants and will look great. However, Susan knows that her
neighbor is dying of obesity. If Susan gives her neighbor the remain-
ing mixture, her neighbor will lose a significant amount of weight and
survive. Susan decides to take the rest of the mixture herself.7
28 Organ Donor
Cindy wakes up one morning and finds a strange woman next to her
in bed. A man from the Society of Music Lovers introduces himself
and explains to Cindy that if she agrees to have this woman, a famous
violinist, plugged into her kidney, she can save her from kidney failure.
Without Cindy’s help, the violinist will die. The man from the Society
explains that Cindy must stay plugged into the violinist for 11 months
in order for her to recover. Cindy agrees. Nine months after Cindy
has been plugged into the violinist, she pulls the plug and the violinist
dies.7
29 Shoe Fetish ∗∗
Brian has a shoe fetish. Sometimes he will buy women’s shoes, but
his favorite thing to do is take shoes from women as they are trying
on clothing at the department store. He brings the shoe with him to
the bathroom, where he smells and caresses it. He then brings the
shoe back before anyone notices.8
30 Webcam
Angela is a single mother during an economic recession. She was
recently fired from her job in retail and now has no way to feed her
family. As she is walking home one day, a man offers to hire her for
his website. The job consists of being filmed going to the bathroom
and broadcasting it on the internet. Her face would not be shown.
Angela has had difficulty finding a job so she decides to take this one.8
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31 Manure Prank ∗∗
A student is angry with her teacher for giving her a bad grade. So she
drives by the teacher’s house late one night and throws dog poo at
the teacher’s windows. However, the student falls short of her target.
The dog poo lands in the garden instead, and ends up fertilizing the
teacher’s flowers.8
32 Modern Play
Fredriks is a well-known playwright. In his latest post-modern play,
there is a scene where actors crawl around naked onstage acting like
animals, urinating and pretending to mate with each other. The
mayor has called the play indecent and demands an immediate halt
to the performances. But Fredriks disregards the mayor’s orders and
continues putting on the play in the name of art.8
33 Biology Class ∗∗
Mr. Lombardi’s biology class is learning about the reproductive sys-
tem. He thinks it would be instructive if the students could look at
live sperm cells under the microscope, so he asks a couple of his male
students to masturbate into a beaker in the bathroom and come back
with samples for the class to look at.8
34 Bad Blood
Jimmy is a pedophile, but he fears getting caught. Instead of touching
children, he donates his blood to the local children’s hospital. He likes
the idea of his blood being inside of them.8
35 French Chef ∗∗
Pierre is the head chef at a trendy French restaurant. He has never
told anyone, but he derives erotic pleasure from touching raw meat.
Whenever he has to tenderize the beef, he imagines he is touching a
beautiful naked woman. Of course, the passion he brings to manipu-
lating the beef makes it especially tender and delicious.8
36 Sperm Bank ∗∗
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Gary donates to the sperm bank once a week to make extra money.
He is tall, intelligent, and good-looking, so he is a popular donor.
However, the only way he can make a sample is if he dresses as a giant
panda. So Gary secretly brings the costume with him to the sperm
bank and changes into it whenever providing a medical sample.8
37 Accidental Porn ∗∗
Mr. Schooner is giving a talk on abstinence to an auditorium full of
eighth-graders when his powerpoint presentation crashes. The screen
that’s open on his computer is the hardcore pornography site he had
been looking at before the talk. All the students and teachers in the
room see the website before he can close the window.8
38 Sexting ∗∗
Jane is sending text messages to her boyfriend when her father comes
to her room to tell her to get off the phone and do her homework. In-
stead of doing her homework, she keeps texting her boyfriend. Jane’s
boyfriend asks her to send a picture of herself in her lingerie. Jane
takes the picture, but is distracted by her father’s nagging, and she
accidentally sends the picture to her father’s cell phone instead.8
39 Modeling Pictures ∗∗
Paul is a closeted homosexual with a wife and family. He is cleaning
up in the living room when he comes across some photographs of
a young man’s muscular body, taken from behind. Paul peruses the
pictures and becomes sexually aroused. He does not realize that these
are pictures his son took of himself to send to a modeling agency.8
40 Taboo Food ∗∗
The government of a totalitarian regime is trying to extract informa-
tion from a woman they believe to be a spy. The spy is part of a
cult that worships snails, and holds that consuming snail meat is an
abomination against God. In order to get the information they want,
the government force feeds the spy escargot until she admits where
her cult’s secret headquarters are.8
41 Voluntary Cannibalism
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Anders and Marcus meet each other on the internet. Anders has
always fantasized about eating another person. Marcus has always
fantasized about being eaten. So Anders and Marcus arrange to meet.
Marcus commits suicide, and Anders chops up Marcus’s body and eats
it in stew over the next few months.8
42 Scroll Napkin
Harold is a tourist visiting a famous cathedral in Europe. He has
brought an ice cream cone inside with him. When the ice cream cone
begins to drip, he takes a scroll that was hanging on the wall and dips
it in holy water, and uses this to wipe up his mess.8
1 Modified from Greene et al. (2008), which itself
is heavily modeled on vignettes appearing in Thomson
(1976), having drawn its inspiration from Foot (1967),
and so forth into the depths of history.
2 Modified from Cushman (2008).
3 From Schnall, Haidt, et al. (2008).
4 From Mele and Cushman (2007).
5 Modified from Haidt et al. (1993).
6 From Haidt, Björklund, and Murphy (2000).
7 From The Moral Sense Test website, accessed July
2007 (unpublished stimuli).
8 Written by N. Strohminger.
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402 subjects (Mdnage = 30, 61% female) completed an online study that lasted
approximately 10 minutes. The study was presented to subjects as two separate polls.
In the first poll, participants wrote a short essay about a recent experience. They
received one of four essay prompts, designed to elicit one of four different emotions:
disgust, sadness, fear, or no emotion (neutral). The disgust condition specified a
kitchen-related disgusting experience to ensure that core disgust would be written
about. For question wording, see Table C.1.
Participants wrote for one minute, after which a button allowing (but not forcing)
them to advance to the next screen would appear. Most people wrote 2–3 sentences.
No one needed to be thrown out for not writing about the topic requested. Initially,
there were only two essay conditions (N neutral = 154, N disgust = 134); after a prelim-
inary analysis failed to uncover any difference between these two conditions, subjects
were added to two additional negative emotion conditions, sadness and fear (N sadness
= 59, N fear = 47).
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Table C.1: Prompts used in the four different essay-writing conditions.
Emotion Essay prompt
Neutral When was the last time you bought an appliance for your
kitchen? What was it? What did you use it for? What other appli-
ances have you bought for your kitchen?
Disgust When was the last time you found something disgusting in
your kitchen? What was it? How did you react when you found it?
What other gross things have you found in your kitchen?
Sadness When was the last time you cried? What were you upset about?
Does this thing still make you sad? What else makes you cry?
Fear When was the last time you were very scared? What were
you afraid of, and why? Was there an immediate physical danger,
or otherwise a threat to your livelihood? In general, what things in the
world have the ability to frighten you?
After the essay-writing task, subjects were asked to report the emotions they had
felt while writing. We used a modification of the scale described in Coan and Allen
(2007, p. 17), which is comparable to the PANAS (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988;
in Gray & Watson, 2007). Thirteen separate emotions were measured in this ma-
nipulation check: amusement, anger, anxiety, confusion, disgust, fear, guilt, interest,
joy, pride, sadness, shame, and surprise. Subjects reported the extent they felt each
emotion on a 1–5 scale (1 = “not at all/none”, 5 = “extremely/a great deal”), fol-
lowed by an overall pleasantness scale (scale 1–7, 1 = “Unpleasant”, 4 = “Neutral”,
7 = “Pleasant”).
Subjects then advanced to the second ‘poll’, where they were presented with one
of a random selection of cartoons from a pool of 120. The cartoons were either clean
or dirty, and were the same as those used in an earlier study using verbal emotion
primes (§ 2.1).
Results
Self-report indicates that each emotion condition reliably induced its target emo-



































































































































































































































































































condition did (Figure C.1). For example, people in the disgust essay condition re-
ported they felt disgust while writing their essay more than any of the other twelve
emotions we asked them about. The disgust essay also elicited disgust more reliably
than the other essay-writing conditions. The one exception was the fear condition,
which elicited fear and anxiety to an equal degree. Since fear and anxiety are closely
related states, these terms may not be meaningfully different for respondents.
In the disgust condition, people unerringly wrote about core disgust elicitors:
mold, rotting food, dead animals, vermin, maggots. A typical response reads: “Today
I found dog vomit on the kitchen floor. I almost threw up myself when I saw it. I’ve
found dead cockroaches several times and slimy hairballs from the cat. Also, I’ve
found rotten food in the refridgerator [sic] many times and rat feces in the pantry. It
is really disgusting to find that rats or mice have been chewing into you [sic] cereal
and other boxes of food and leaving their little droppings on everything.” In the
sadness condition, the most common responses for the last time people cried were
to personal loss or other failures within social relationships. Financial and medical
hardships were also mentioned with a fair degree of frequency. A typical response
reads: “I last cried yesterday. I miss my son. It makes me very sad because I live
far away and can’t afford a plane ticket to go visit him. It’s actually making me cry
now thinking about it. Sad movies or books make me cry too.” Interestingly, a large
proportion (almost 20%) of respondents mentioned works of fiction (movies, books,
or plays) as being the last time they cried. The fact that leisure pursuits give rise to
such a large proportion of the total instances of crying in people’s daily lives speaks
to the ubiquity (and popularity) of benign masochism for sad experiences. In the fear
condition, people most often mentioned brushes with death (a bumpy airplane ride,
walking through a dangerous neighborhood, a hospital trip). In the neutral condition,
people tended to describe nice products that they were happy with. This is confirmed




























Figure C.2: Effect of four different emotional states on funniness judgments of clean
and dirty cartoons. Whiskers represent 95% confidence intervals. All comparisons
are non-significant.
than the midpoint of 4. So, while the control condition effectively avoided eliciting
predominantly negative emotions, it was also not completely emotionally neutral.
The challenge of coming up with a truly neutral control condition in priming studies
is an ongoing one for researchers; see Chapter V for further discussion.
When all negative emotion conditions are compared to the neutral condition, no
difference in humor judgments emerges, even when incorporating cartoon type into
the model. Both the main effect of emotion (t = 1.1, p = .28 for main effect of
emotion) and the interaction effect (t = .57, p = .57) were nonsignificant. The four
emotion priming conditions, when considered separately, were also not significantly
different from one another (all pairwise comparisons NS ).
One limitation of this emotion induction paradigm is that the stimuli are self-
generated, so everyone receives different priming stimuli.1 We can try to account
1To a certain extent, this problem plagues all priming designs, since there will not be uniform
response even when the stimuli are kept constant. And self-generated stimuli have the potential
to be more effective than experimenter-generated stimuli, since the emotional resonance is tailored
to the individual. Nonetheless, variance in past experiences, and ability to remember and vividly
imagine past experiences, can all introduce impediments to uniformly inducing the target emotion.
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for this variability by including the degree to which the emotion was experienced,
according to self-report.
A simple Pearson product-moment correlation revealed no relationship between
the degree to which emotions were felt (across priming conditions) and response to
the subsequent humor judgment. This was true whether looking at the combined
(additive) score for all emotions (r = .03, p = .54), looking at only the additive score
for negative emotions (composite of anger, anxiety, confusion, disgust, fear, sadness,
shame; r = -.009, p = .86), looking at the overall valence (pleasantness) score (r =
.06, p = .26), or looking at individual emotion self-reports, such as disgust or fear
(all correlations for individual emotions NS ). Therefore, neither overall emotionality,
negative affect, or individual emotions in the essay-writing portion predicted the
degree to which subjects subsequently enjoyed the cartoons.
When these scores are incorporated into a linear mixed effects model, the results
are equally unpredictive of cartoon enjoyment. For example, self-report disgust failed
to reveal any interesting between-emotion condition differences in humor response (t
= 1.05, p = 32), nor was there an interaction effect in funniness between emotion
condition and self-report disgust (t = 1.29, p = 21). Overall negative emotions score
had no effect on judgment (t = .16, p = .92), nor did overall level of emotionality
(t = .91, p = .38). Affective valence did not predict how funny the cartoon would
be rated (t = 1.27, p = .20; all other comparisons in this model NS ). Including the
other primary emotion categories was similarly unenlightening.
Discussion
Using memories of past experiences as an emotion prime had no effect on sub-
sequent humor judgments. Three separate negative emotional memories, including
disgust, had no effect on enjoyment of cartoons, whether to one another, or compared
to a neutral control condition. The degree to which emotions were experienced, as
measured by self-report, also made no difference in how the cartoons were rated.
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These null effects go against both our hypotheses and the prevailing wisdom that
emotional effects are congruency-based. They also go against previous experimen-
tal work showing that incidental fear and anxiety can increase amusement (Shurcliff,
1968; Cantor et al., 1974).
Given the failure to find any kind of emotional effect on these judgments, these
results may be more profitably thought of as a limitation of the priming methodology
rather than a failure to conceptually replicate previous findings. These results may
point to the fragility of emotional priming methods more generally: several factors go
into whether an incidental emotion will or will not have a net effect on behavior. One
reason is that people can discount an incidental emotional state, especially if they are
made aware of it before the target judgment is made, for example by making a self-
report of the emotion (Schwarz & Clore, 1983). The self-report scale also increases
the amount of time that passes before getting to the target judgment, thus allowing
the emotion trace more chance to fade. Most of our past experiments have used
repeated measures; this was a single-trial design (one memory, one judgment). The
single emotional prime may not have been strong enough on its own, and having only
one opportunity to see how the emotion affected humor judgment for each subject
may have also reduced power. Proper experimental priming paradigms are engaged in
a balancing act between having the emotion be strong enough that it’s ‘louder’ than
the noise created by other incidental factors (such as the subject’s previous mood,
their level of attention to the task, and the strength of their baseline judgment), but
not so loud or obvious that the experimenter’s intention is revealed.
It is certainly possible that this experiment reveals a legitimate boundary condi-
tion to the concepts under study: maybe memories serve as a bad prime for affecting
humor judgments, and humor is only affected by a limited set of emotion inducers.
It bears noting that the methods used here were modeled after methods used suc-
cessfully by other researchers, and in fact were developed on the basis of guidance
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provided from an emotion elicitation handbook (Coan & Allen, 2007). We were not
using a novel or untested methodology, though it is one that does not appear to have
been used for humor judgments before.
Another possibility is that the positiveness of the neutral condition gave humor
ratings a boost in the same way as the negative emotions did, thereby leading to no
net difference in ratings. This possibility is made less plausible by the observation that
people who reported low levels of emotion, or neutral levels of affect, performed no
differently on the task than those who reported strong emotional states. Nonetheless,
a more emotionally neutral control condition would allow us to make that conclusion
more definitively.
If nothing else, this experiment serves as a caution against strong generalizations
made about the effects discussed elsewhere in this document. One of the themes
running through this dissertation is that we should hesitate from saying that any
given emotion always has the same kind of effect on downstream judgments. The same
emotion can have opposing influences on judgment, and frequently, that emotion will
have no measurable effect at all. The conditions outlined in this experiment provide
one example of where negative emotions have no net effect on humor judgments. A
task for future research will be outlining the precise conditions that can lead to the
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